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Problem Description
MAC sequence counting is a well proven technique in wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (wIDS).
During a project done by Eirik Holgernes and Øystein Aas Pedersen fall 2009, discoveries of
potential problems with link-layer Quality-of-Service/802.11e enabled networks was uncovered in
regards to MAC sequence counting as a detection technique in wIDS.
This master thesis will focus on these issues, and look into the possibilities for enhancing the
detection techniques to avoid both false negatives and false positives in regards of detecting
attacks. During the project Eirik and Øystein developed a wIDS, named SIDS (Simple Intrusion
Detection System) to be used in Wireless Trondheim open wireless network. The work done in this
thesis will use SIDS as a framework and testing environment.
An article published by Chandrasekaran, Deymoous, Ganapathy, Gruteser and Trappe:  Detecting
Identity Spoofs in 802.11e Wireless Networks  focus on how to cope with the 802.11e security flaw,
and suggests an optimized MAC sequence counting algorithm to deal with the 802.11e issues. This
thesis will focus on further testing of the proposed algorithm, and rely on experiments to analyze
the problem further. Finally it will focus on revealing potential weaknesses and improvements in
the solution proposed by the article.
Assignment given: 15. January 2010
Supervisor: Stig Frode Mjølsnes, ITEM

Abstract
Open wireless networks are commonly deployed as a result of easy access,
user-friendliness, as well as easy deployment and maintance. These net-
works do not implement strong security features, and clients are prone to a
myriad of possible attacks. Identity attacks are considered one of the most
severe, and as a result of this Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be
deployed. With the introduction of 802.11e/Quality-of-Service on a link-to-
link basis in 802.11 networks, most IDS will become obsolete as they often
rely on a detection technique known as MAC Sequence Counting Analysis.
This specific technique will become useless if 802.11e/QoS is enabled on the
network. In this thesis I have analyzed the problem further, and suggest
new techniques, both implemented and verified as an IDS, as well as ana-
lytic theories in order to enhance MAC Sequence Counting Analysis to cope
with the new features of 802.11e. There has been related work on the same
issue, but this thesis questions their use of unreliable physical parameters
in order to detect attacks. As we will see, my new proposed techniques rely
on analysis of the 802.11 standard and the 802.11e amendent, and are not
dependent on parameters which could be unreliable in urban and mobile
environments. Experiments and analysis will demonstrate the validity of
the new suggested techniques, and the outcome of the thesis will divided
into two parts; Development of an optimized Intrusion Detection System
and an enhanced algorithm in order to detect attacks which exploits the
new features of 802.11e.
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1
Introduction
This chapter will give a more in-depth background of the problems provided
in the foreword of this thesis. I will first overview the background for wire-
less Intrusion Detection Systems and their use in open wireless networks.
Further I will give a more detailed description of the problems handled in
this thesis. Section 1.4 will give an overview of the report outline, and show
how the report is built up. Finally, in section 1.5, I will relate to work done
by others in this same area of research.
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1.1 Background
Wireless networks are deployed widely across the globe today. Open Wire-
less networks are commonly deployed to cope with user friendliness, easy
access as well as easy deployment and scalability. Typical areas of deploy-
ments include Airports, Cafes and primarily in public places. Due to the
number of increasing users that wants quick access to the internet, there
are demands for networks that will give users easy access without too much
hassle in the connection and authorization phase.
As a result of this, open 802.11 wireless networks are deployed. These
networks offers no security features by the means of the 802.11 standardiza-
tions, but they often implement simpler solutions - such as captive portals.
Captive portals will pick up every package sent from a proper associated
Station (STA) to an Access Point (AP), and return a login page to the client
if correct credentials are not given. Once the client enters proper credentials,
the captive portal will mark the clients STA Media Access Control (MAC)
address on a white list, and will thus forward all traffic to and from the
internet to the associated clients STA. The login credentials can be a pre-
negotiated username/password combination, or by paying a fee to get tem-
porary access - usually a 24 hour window access.
Unfortunately, as no security or encryption features are implemented,
these networks are exposed to several security threats. The goal behind
the administrators of these networks are usually not to secure their users or
the network from being penetrated, but to make sure that their users get
quick and easy access to the internet. Nevertheless, there are demands for
systems to detect if attacks are carried out. This is the case due to legal
matters, were one wants to make sure that if an illegal act has been carried
out from a clients credentials, we must determine that it was in fact the
4
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legit client who was unlawful, and not someone else stealing his/her session
and credentials. This is known as identity attacks. Systems designed to
detect attacks like these are commonly referred to as Intrusion Detection
System (IDS). More on these in section 2.3.
1.1.1 Project Assignment 2009
During the mandatory project for our study in Communication Technology
fall 2009, myself and Øystein Aas Pedersen developed a simple Intrusion
Detection System, named Simple IDS (SIDS). The report is provided in
[2]. SIDS is a program written in Perl, and its goal is to be deployed next
to open wireless networks to detect if a legit clients connection is, or has
been, stolen. SIDS is what is commonly referred to as a Passive Wireless
Intrusion Detection System (wIDS). This means that it will not interfere
with the current infrastructure of the network, but be deployed in the same
geographical area as the network being monitored. SIDS use a technique
called MAC Sequence Counting analysis to detect if two STAs using the
same MAC address are associated to the same AP at the same time, and is
thus a countermeasure to MAC freeloader attacks [2].
During the project we uncovered a potential weakness in regards to
Quality of Service (QoS) enabled networks and the use of MAC Sequence
Counting as a detection technique. By enabling QoS on the link-layer in
these networks, many IDS may become obsolete as the detection techniques
are not optimized to cope with new features of the 802.11e amendent, often
implemented by Wi-Fi Mulitmedia (WMM). There has been some work
carried out simultaneously with ours, as provided in [3], were the authors
suggest using parameters from the physical layer of the Open System Inter-
connection Reference Model (OSI) as a reliable source for verifying 802.11e
optimized attacks described in section 3.2.
5
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Nevertheless, in this master thesis I question how their work will suite
a real-life setting, such as for instance deploying the solution in an urban
and mobile environment as the one obtained by Wireless Trondheim. As
physical parameters are not reliable in a mobile and urban environment, I
will in this master thesis suggest new techniques, and hopefully find other
ways which are more reliable and suitable for environments were parameters
from the physical layer are not reliable.
1.1.2 Wireless Trondheim
Wireless Trondheim (TrT), or Trådløse Trondheim in Norwegian, is an
NTNU organization which main goal is to provide easy internet access for
the inhabitants and student in the city of Trondheim, Norway. TrT use a
distributed architecture for their wireless network, known as Cisco Unified
Wireless Network (CUWN). Login credentials and security are provided
with the use of Captive Portals. Students can log in with their university
login credentials to get free access, and the rest of the inhabitants can pay
a small fee to get access for a specific time frame. (Usually 24 hours).
Throughout the city there are deployed Lightweight Access Point (LAP)s
to cover most of the downtown area as possible, maintained and serviced
by Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) controllers.1
In this master thesis I will conduct my experiments on the same lab
equipment as we used in the project 2009. The lab setup is a direct replica
of the CUWN network maintained by Wireless Trondheim. This means that
the development of SIDS v2.0 in this master thesis should suit the network
topology and deployment of the network maintained by TrT well, and as
I will show in the conclusion of this thesis, with further testing and some
1Wireless Trondheim are well described in the project assignment provided in [2]
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rewriting of code, SIDS v2.0 could be a complete IDS deployed in CUWN
networks, such as the network maintained by Wireless Trondheim.
1.2 The Problem
MAC sequence counting has proven to be a good and reliable detection
technique in 802.11 networks [4]. However, there are complications in opti-
mizing the detection technique to cope with the new features from 802.11e,
described in section 2.5. One of the main issues is that most IDS do not
distinguish between the different QoS classes, thus concluding that an at-
tack is occurring when a client use link-layer QoS. With the introduction
of 802.11e QoS enabled wireless networks, came the feature were multiple
transmission queues in sequence counting were allowed. This means that
the STA keeps one counter for each of the 8 Traffic Identifier (TID) QoS
classes available from 802.11e. The result is that most IDS with MAC Se-
quence Counting as a reliable technique for detecting will be obsolete. The
MAC Sequence Counting algorithms simply are not capable of distinguish
between the TID classes. One could think that it should be fair to just keep
track of each of the sequence number counters and analyze them indepen-
dently, but as I will show in section 3.2, this potentially opens up for new
attacks.
Chandrasekaran, Deymious, Ganapathy, Gruteser and Trapper [3] sug-
gest using parameters from the physical layer to improve the MAC sequence
detection algorithm described in 2.4. Their work focus mainly on measur-
ing Received Signal Strength (RSS) values originating from the same MAC
Source address, and calculate the Eucledian distance using received RSS
values from a STA between two time intervals. Simultaneously with the
writing of this master thesis, Øystein Aas Pedersen is writing his thesis
7
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on the behavior of RSS measurements in a city-like environment. Due to
this, this thesis will propose and demonstrate new thinking in the areas of
combining MAC Sequence Counting analysis with link-layer QoS enabled
wireless networks. I will show that it is not necessary to rely on uncer-
tain physical parameters, such as RSS measurements analysis in order to
conclude if attacks are carried out in 802.11e enabled open 802.11 wireless
networks.
1.3 Contrubitions
My contributions in this master thesis are how to implement a trustworthy
IDS which does not become unusable when QoS/802.11e is enabled on the
network. As most wireless IDS heavily rely on MAC Sequence Counting for
detection, these will become obsolete as they will trigger false alarms as a
result of a STA using QoS on the network, where in fact there was no attack
at all. In a worst case scenario they are not capable of detecting attacks
at all, if an attacker knows how to exploit the new features of 802.11e as
described in section 3.2. In section 1.5 we will see that related work has
been done on this same area of research, but I am questioning their work,
and will in propose new thinking and more reliable techniques to cope with
the problems QoS/802.11e introduces. The outcome of this thesis will thus
be divided into two parts:
(1) SIDS v2.0 I will improve, implement and test new detection tech-
niques in SIDS v2.0
(2) Algorithm I will propose a new algorithm in order to detect QoS
optimized attacks without relying on physical parameters.
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1.4 Report Outline
The work done in this master thesis is a continuation of the work carried
out by me, Eirik Holgernes, and Øystein Aas Pedersen during the fall 2009.
The thesis will keep strong focus the proposed solution provided in [3], as
well further development of SIDS in regards to the problem description
overviewed in section 1.2. Due to this, the paper will be divided into three
parts. Part I - Introduction provides the introduction and background
needed to understand the problem, as well as given an overview of the
report outline and related work. Part II - Developing an IDS mainly
concentrates on how SIDS v2.0 is developed, and keeps focus on my methods
of choice, as well as the results when testing the IDS. Part III - Discussion
and Analysis will start by discussing the implemented techniques in SIDS,
and further concentrate on analytic detection techniques not implemented
in SIDS. Finally, as a result of this, I propose an enhanced algorithm for
QoS/802.11e optimized attacks.
Chapter 2 provides the background theory relevant for the work
done in this thesis. The chapter starts with basic knowledge on
the 802.11 standard, and further elaborates on attacks in 802.11
networks. Further I will describe the basics behind Intrusion
Detection Systems and techniques commonly used by these. The
chapter will end by detailing the 802.11e/QoS standard which
is important in regards to the work done in this thesis.
Chapter 3 will show my methods of choice in the creation of
an Intrusion Detection System. The chapter will first define a
proper threat model, and continue to show how I programmed
SIDS v2.0, as well as propose new techniques, and how these
9
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were implemented in the IDS. This chapter is best read in com-
bination by looking at the code provided in appendix B.
Chapter 4 will show the results of the work described in chapter
3. As I have proposed two new techniques for optimizing Intru-
sion Detection Systems in order to cope with the QoS/802.11e
problems described in this introduction, this chapter will show
the results when executing SIDS v2.0 in different scenarios.
Chapter 5 will concentrate on the work done on SIDS v2.0,
and discussions on the implemented techniques in the IDS. The
results and source code from SIDS v2.0 will be my first contri-
bution from this master thesis as described in section 1.3.
Chapter 6 will elaborate on analytic detection techniques not
implemented in the IDS yet. It elaborate on theories and analy-
sis of the background theory chapter 2 in order to propose new
analytic detection techniques.
Chapter 7 proposes a new algorithm as an epitome of the tech-
niques and methods discussed in chapter 5 and 6. This algorithm
is my second contribution in this thesis as shown in section 1.3.
Chapter 8 suggests subjects that are suitable for future work
as a result of the work done in this thesis. There are several as-
pects that is not considered in this thesis, and the final outcome
will show that two major subjects should be further analyzed;
completing the development of SIDS v2.0 and work on Active
Probing as a detection technique.
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Chapter 9 concludes the thesis, and will provide the reader
with a summary of the work achieved.
1.5 Related Work
When looking at a particular area of research, it is important to gain knowl-
edge of what others have achieved in the same area. As stated throughout
this introduction, I will keep focus on developing an Intrusion Detection
System, as well as how to cope with newly introduced problems that came
with 802.11e/QoS in regards to IDS in general. In section 1.5.1 I will look at
work done on how to use RSS in localization based measurements, and its
use in Intrusion Detection Systems monitoring mobile environments. Fur-
ther in section 1.5.2 we will see that work has been done on how to optimize
detection techniques to cope with the problems with 802.11e networks and
wIDS. Finally, in section 1.5.3 I will look at a specific technique proposed
by Jason Smith [5] on how to use protocol and standard specifics to detect
abnormalities and attacks in wireless networks.
1.5.1 RSS and IDS
Wilson M. Yeung and Joseph K. Ng paper on "Wireless LAN Positioning
based on Received Signal Strength from Mobile device and Access Points"
[6] takes a great interest in how to use RSS measurements on mobile en-
vironments to measure the geographical location of mobile devices. The
paper states that they need to use average RSS values in order to deter-
mine a single position, as RSS values are not always conclusive in small
time intervals. At an even more interesting level, Øystein Aas Pedersen is
writing his thesis on RSS measurements in urban and mobile environments;
"Detecting Wireless Identity Spoofs in Urban Settings Based on Received
11
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Signal Strength Measurements" [7]. The results from his work show that
RSS is not at all reliable and conclusive when moving away from office
landscapes and lab environments, and into urban environments. The rate
of failure stated above may be adequate concerning location based services,
but Intrusion Detection Systems should rely on reliable and conclusive pa-
rameters in order to trigger alarms on attacks. This will be kept in strong
focus throughout this thesis, and as we will see, my new proposed algorithm
for detecting QoS optimized attacks does not rely on RSS measurements,
as opposed to the suggested algorithm from [3].
1.5.2 802.11e and IDS
As described in section 1.1.1, during our semester assignment project fall
2009, myself and Øystein Aas Pedersen discovered the flaw with many Intru-
sion Detection Systems as overviewed in section 1.2. During the completion
of the paper, we discovered a paper which describes and suggests solutions
to the 802.11e QoS introduced problems. This paper is given in [3], and this
thesis keeps strong focus on their suggested algorithm on how to cope with
MAC Sequence Counting in regards to detecting attacks in 802.11e enabled
networks. As we will see in section 3.3, the paper suggests using RSS mea-
surements in order to verify if an attack is ongoing. The work done by [6]
and [7] from the previous section shows that in mobile, and especially urban
environments, RSS values are not always conclusive. As a result of this I
will look into how to use techniques which is not dependent on unreliable
parameters to detect attacks.
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1.5.3 Specification-based IEEE 802.11 Attack Detection
Jason Smith [5], chapter 7, section 7.3 proposes to look at specifications
from the 802.11 and 802.1X2 standards to detect attacks. The paper keeps
strong focus on Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, but many of the ideas and
methods are interesting in my setting as well. Smith exploits how states in
802.1X, EAP works, by looking at expected management frames to detect
abnormalities in the authentication and association phase of clients. This
thesis will use some of the basics behind this detection technique, but will
instead concentrate on the three 802.11 states specified in section 2.1.3
which is used in open 802.11 wireless networks. The ideas with the use of
behavior based detection technique in regards to how IEEE 802.11 operates
is interesting, and we will see that I will use some of the same structure and
thinking as Jason Smith, but in a less complicated matter.
2802.1X provides authentication features in 802.11 networks
13
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2
Background Theory
In order to understand the methods and ideas in this thesis, one should have
a thorough understanding of some basic background theory. This chapter
will provide the basic background theory necessary in order to understand
the work done in the subsequent chapters. First I will give a short intro-
duction to the IEEE 802.11 standard, and relate it to different attacks in
802.11 networks. Further, in section 2.3 I will provide a quick overview of
the ideas behind Intrusion Detection Systems. To understand the detection
techniques in regards to these, I will look at different detection utilized by
IDS in section 2.4. As 802.11e is an important part of this thesis, I will
provide a detailed introduction of the amendent in section 2.5. Finally, a
17
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quick look at the RSS values and their use is provided in section 2.6.
2.1 IEEE 802.11
802.11 is a standard formalized by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), and is detailed in [1]. In short terms, the idea behind
802.11 is to provide a set of standards to make wireless networks work across
different platforms, as well as between different vendors. 802.11 networks,
or WLANs, are deployed widely across the globe, both in private homes as
well as in public areas. In my thesis I will keep focus on the latter. There
are many different standards and variations of the 802.11 standard set, but
I will keep my focus on the actual frames and frame types used by 802.11,
also known as the MAC frame. This was last defined in the 802.11-2007
[1]. 802.11 operates in the Data link layer and the physical layer of the OSI
model provided in figure 2.1. The Data Link layer is a combination of a
Logic Link Control (LLC) layer and a MAC layer. This basically means
the layer used to link up two stations, and how they should communicate
to each other. This is the final layer before the actual physical data is
sent through a physical channel, such as Ethernet or by radio in wireless
networks.
2.1.1 Ad-Hoc And Infrastructure
Wireless Networks can either be deployed in Ad-Hoc- or infrastructure
mode. In Ad-Hoc mode every STA acts as an AP, and every AP is a
STA. This setup does not require a centralized entity managing the clients,
but every client manages itself and those connected to it. In infrastructure
wireless networks, there is a specific set of hardware which provides a set of
services to clients, commonly explained as AP serving STAs. In this scheme
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Figure 2.1: The OSI Reference Model
one AP can serve many clients, or STAs, often providing access to a wired
network, like a backbone network, or as a bridge to the internet. This is
a centralized approach, and due to the common deployment of these, this
master thesis will focus on the latter case.
2.1.2 The 802.11 MAC Frame
All communication in 802.11 environments between APs and STAs are ex-
changed by using three different types of frames. Which frame type to be
used depends on what the purpose of the communication is. The different
use of frames types and subtypes depends on how to exchange data, as well
as establishing and maintaining the wireless link between the two nodes.
Every 802.11 frame consists of which 802.11 version is used, the frame type,
as well as various indicators and flags set for the specific frame. Also com-
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mon for each 802.11 frame is that every frame consists of the source and
destination MAC address, sequence number, frame body and a frame Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) control field. This is further explained below.
An overview of how the frames are built up are given in figure 2.2. The use
of fields will vary depending on which frame types are used, but the setup
scheme is always the same. Figure 2.2 does not show any other layers then
LLC or MAC layer, but before each frame there also exist a preamble frame
and a Physical Layer Convergense Procedure (PLCP) Header, but their use
are meant for physical layer purposes. For a complete list of the type of
frames and their subtypes, see table A.1 in appendix A.
Explanation Of The 802.11 MAC frame The first field is the frame
control, and consists of two -2- bytes. This is an important field in regards
to monitoring and analyzing 802.11 frames. The field will tell you different
parameters about the frame, like which type it is, as well as other important
parameters about this specific frame. Duration is the calculated value from
a STAs perspective on how long it will take until the frame is transmitted.
Address 1, 2, 3 and 4 are MAC addresses. Address 1 is always the address
of the originating node, address 2 is the destination address, and address
3 is in most cases the address to the final destination inside the backbone
network. The 4th address is an optional one. All these addresses are written
as 48 bit hex format, commonly known as MAC addresses. Seq is a field
providing sequence number for each frame delivered between two stations.
More on sequence numbers in the next paragraph. Finally the actual data
or payload is inserted. This field is variable, but can be a maximum of 2312
bytes per frame. The 4-byte checksum field exists for error control, such as
CRC check in order to make sure that the bits in the frame were received
correctly. Below are given an overview of the different frame types used in
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802.11, how they are built up, and when they are used [1] [8].
Figure 2.2: The 802.11 frame
Sequence Numbers In 802.11 Frames In 802.11 environments, as de-
fined in the 802.11-2007 standard [1], the transmitting party always keeps
track of a unique sequence number for each frame successfully transmit-
ted to the receiving party. This means that a STA transmitting a 802.11
frame to an AP, keeps track of a sequence number counter for each frame
it sends to that specific AP. The sequence number field from figure 2.2
shows that there are reserved 2 bytes, or 16 bits, for sequence control. 4 of
these are used for fragmentation purposes to ensure that every MAC Service
Data Unit (MSDU) or MAC Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) have one specific
fragment number until all pieces of the packet are correctly delivered.
The remaining 12 of these are reserved to provide sequence number
control of frames independent of which fragment or type of frame it is. As
a result of this there can be a maximum of 212 different combination of
sequence numbers, which in human terms read 4096. Thus, the station
marks the first frame with zero -0-, increase the sequence number field with
one -1- for every frame, wrapping around 4096, and begins the procedure
all over. Thus, the STA and AP keeping track of fragmentation of data, as
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well as the frames being received in correctly order. Also note that sequence
control fields is not present in control frames, as they are meant only for
simple control communication, and are not sequential important.
Management Frames
The purpose of management frames are to establish and maintain the wire-
less link between the AP and STAs. It is not just important to establish
a link between STA and AP, but also to maintaining the link in terms
of making sure that the STA are still there, as well as other link specific
parameters to obtain a good connection. Management frames have many
subtypes, and in table 2.1 I have given a quick overview of the different
subtypes and when they are used.
Control Frames
The control frames are used in assistance in delivery of data frames. Control
frames are used in order to avoid frame collision due to the hidden station
problem1, as well as acknowledging when frames are transmitted correctly.
The different types of control frames are explained in table2.2 and provided
in figure 2.3. As described in section 2.1.2, the sequence control field is
not present in control frames. Also note that the network does not have
to enable RTS/CTS due to traffic overhead, resulting in the network not
answering on RTS control messages.
1The hidden station problem is when two STAs associated to the same AP don’t see
each other resulting in frame collisions
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Frame Subtype Description
Authentication Frame These frames are used in the process of accepting
or rejecting the radio interface of a Network Inter-
face Controller (NIC). The procedure for using these
frames depends on which security parameters are used.
For my concern I consider open 802.11 wireless net-
works with no encryption from the 802.11 standard
set, so two authentication frames are sent in order to
authenticate
Deauthentication Frame These frames are used when a station whishes to ter-
minate potential secure sessions.
Association Request Frame These frames are used when a STA wishes to associate
its NIC with the NIC of the AP. The frame contains
parameters of the NIC, what is supported, as well as
the SSID of the network it wishes to associate with.
Association Response Frame Respones to the Association Request Frame. Ap-
proval/Disapproval of the NIC.
Reassociation request frame If an STA roams between APs finding a better AP in
terms of signal strength for instance, it will issue a
reassociation request frame to the new AP.
Reassociation response frame The AP accept or rejects the Reassociation Frame
from above.
Disassociation frame This is used to terminate the association.
Beacon Frame AP periodically can broadcast its existence and relay
information. Includes parameters like SSID, times-
tamp and so forth.
Probe request frame Used by one NIC to probe other NICs. For instance
probe APs in the area to reveal their existence.
Probe response frame Response to the probe request frame above. In-
clude information like capability information, sup-
ported data rates etc.
Table 2.1: The different subtype frames of management frames.
Data Frames
Data frames encapsulate payloads from a higher layer in the OSI model,
and sends them between stations. These are the frames which consist of the
actual data. The frame consists of a frame control field, the 4 address fields,
the frame body and a frame check sequence field. The payload can be up to
2312 bytes long, which means that most information needs fragmentation
of many data frames in a row to complete sending all the information. In
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Frame Subtype Description
Request to Send (RTS) frame To avoid collisions in the delivery of data frames in the
hidden station problem, the RTS/CTS combination is
optional in the wireless environment.
Clear to Send (CTS) frame Response to a RTS frame. Together with RTS
this makes a two-way handshake before issuing data
frames.
Acknowledge (ACK) frame When receiving a data frame, the receiving station
will perform error control on the received frame, and
acknowledge the frame if no errors are calculated. If
the sending station does not receive an ACK for a
period of time, it will retransmit the frame.
Table 2.2: The different subtype frames of control frames.
Figure 2.3: Overview of the different Control Frames
streaming of content, i.e. UDP, a continuation of fragmentation and sending
is required. Therefore Data Frames rely strictly on the order in which frames
are delivered, where fragmentation ID, control frames and sequence number
play a crucial role in order to successfully transmit information between the
STA and AP. Data frames follow the exact frame setup as provided in figure
2.2.
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2.1.3 802.11 States
The 802.11-2007 standard [1] chapter 11.3 shows that in 802.11 environ-
ments each STA keeps track of states for each AP (or another STA in non
infrastructure mode) it is connected to and vice versa. There are several
messages that can be exchanged between a STA and AP in the authenti-
cation and association phase. Each AP keeps a state of every STA that
has been used or is being used against the AP. The different states and
the relationship between them are shown in figure 2.4. The initial state is
where a STA is not authenticated or associated with the AP. When a STA
wants to associate to an AP, it first sends out an authentication frame as
described in 2.1.2. This is to inform the AP that it wants to associate, and
that every parameter is in order. This is marked as State two -2- in the
figure below. If the authentication response is successful, the STA can go
ahead and send an association request to the AP, and if the Association
request is successful, the AP is proper authenticated and associated with
the AP; State 3. If the STA sends a deauthenticate frame to the AP while
in state 3, the AP will also disassociate the STA, bringing the state back to
state zero -0-.
• State 1 - Initial state, unauthenticated, unassociated
• State 2 - Authenticated, not associated
• State 3 - Authenticated and Associated
In figure 2.4 not all messages are shown. There are a total of 7 manage-
ment frames that can issue a state change. In addition to the Authenticate,
Associate, Deauthenticate, dissassociate and deauthenticate frames shown
in the figure, a STA can also issue re-associate and re-authenticate frames if
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the STA is roaming between APs, or for some other reason the association
or authentication is lost.
Figure 2.4: The different states in 802.11 [1]
2.2 Attacks In IEEE 802.11 Environments
There are numerous different attacks that can be carried out in wireless
networks. A potential flaw with wireless networks, contrary to wired net-
works, is that potentially everyone can hear everything at all times. Thus,
the access of data is more accessible then on closed wired networks. [9] has
divided the different attacks into eight categories, namely:
1. Network Discovery;
2. Passive Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis;
3. Message Injection and Active Eavesdropping;
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4. Message Deletion and Interception;
5. Masquerading: Malicious AP and Session Hijacking;
6. Man-in-The-Middle;
7. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks;
8. IEEE 802.11i specific attacks
According to my threat model as described in section 3.1, I will in this
thesis focus on two of these. Passive Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis and
Masquerading: Malicious AP and Session Hijacking as defined in my threat
model chapter 3, section 3.1. It is important to distinguish between active
and passive attacks. Passive attacks means that the attacker acts only as an
observer to the network, and does not interact with the system at all. Thus,
passive attacks are almost impossible to detect in wireless environments. In
active attacks, the attacker’s goal is to gain access to network resources,
issue Denial-of-service attacks or change some of the topology or security
mechanisms of the network. These attacks can be detected.
2.2.1 Eavesdropping And Traffic Analysis
This is a passive attack, and they are usually easy to perform. Here, the
attacker use some sniffing tool2 on his hardware, picking up the same in-
formation as the AP or STA if he is within the same geographical area
as the network information he wants to analyze. Thus, eavesdropping is
usually a simple matter to perform, but the actual traffic analysis can be
more complex depending on if the information is encrypted, as well as skills
2Wireshark, airodump etc
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in terms of know-how of how the 802.11 protocols operate. In most cases,
the attacker use eavesdropping and traffic analysis attack in combination
with other types of attacks to achieve his/her goal. This attack is often the
starting point from an attackers perspective in order to gather information
about clients, as well as other network parameters [9].
2.2.2 Masquerading: Session Hijacking
This attack is an active one, here the attacker’s goal is to imitate a legitimate
AP or steal and imitate the characteristics of a legit STA. Again, according
to the threat model described in 3.1, I will keep focus on the latter case. Af-
ter performing the attack described above, the attacker gathers information
about STAs and network topology, and can for instance change his MAC
address to that of a valid user. This is a MAC Spoofing attack, and as
discussed earlier I will keep strong focus on detection of these. The attack
described in the previous section is also important in regards to gather in-
formation about Quality-of-Service parameters as focused on in this thesis.
In open 802.11 wireless networks, no traffic is encrypted in the MAC/LLC-
layer, thus resulting in the attacker reading all frame information in the
same fashion as the AP or STA.
2.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion Detection Systems are systems designed primarily to detect abnor-
malities in penetration of the network, or any of its clients. These systems
are in contrary to Intrusion Prevention Systems, or IPS, which goal is to
detect and prevent attacks. IDS commonly include various detection tech-
niques and combinations of these in order to conclude that an attack has
occurred - or is occurring. Usually one categorizes IDS in four types [10]:
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• Network Based;
• Network Behavior Analysis (NBA);
• Host Based;
• Wireless
In this thesis I will look explicitly on the last one, Wireless Intrusion
Detection Systems. Wireless IDS can be further divided into two categories;
Passive and Active. Passive IDS are deployed next to the wireless medium
in which it wants to monitor, and rely on eavesdropping and traffic analysis
to detect attacks. In active IDS, the system may take an active part of the
network; usually in terms of probing STAs or other network nodes either
upon suspicion of attacks or on a random or regular basis. A good overview
of wireless intrusion detection systems can be found in [11] and in our project
2009 [2].
2.4 Detection Techniques
Many techniques for detecting attacks have been proposed earlier. Below
I have categorized detection techniques that have received attention in the
security community, as well as others in which I am considering in this
thesis. For a detection technique to be good, it is of high importance to
keep the false positives as well as false negatives to a minimum. One has
to make sure that the system in fact triggers alarms upon attacks, as well
as trust the system to raise alarms with high credibility. In the latter case,
the system may become unusable, cracking under the weight of number of
false alarms.
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There is a common understanding that one detection technique usually
is not good at its own. The key is a combination of different techniques to
increase the level of credibility of the detection, and many Wireless IDS rely
on strong statistical and probability calculations together with combinations
of techniques to trigger alarms of attacks [10].
2.4.1 MAC Sequence Control Analysis
As described in section 2.1.2 and 2.5.3 there exists a wrapping sequence
counter for each successful frame transmitted between a STA and AP. If
only one unique STA is connected to the AP the sequence number for each
frame should be increased by one -1- for every frame delivered. Nevertheless,
if a masquerading attack is performed as described in section 2.2.2, where
the MAC address has been spoofed, one should see two simultaneously
counters originating from the same source MAC address. This could be an
indication of an attack, but as we will see further in this thesis, there are
complications in this detection technique in QoS enabled 802.11 networks.
2.4.2 RSS Monitoring And Physical Parameter Analysis
This method includes parameters from the physical layer of the OSI model
provided in figure 2.1. As vendors include ways for their NIC to measure
the signal strength between STA and AP, the IDS could analyze these mea-
surements to see if RSS measurements are oscillating between two or more
values within a short time frame. This could be an indication of an attack,
where the same source STA is geographically located at two different places
- which of course is impossible. The great advantage with this technique is
that it is not protocol dependent, meaning that it does not have to consider
protocol specifics from higher layers of the OSI model, and is thus easy to
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implement and does not care about encryption, security features, QoS or
other protocol specific parameters. The disadvantage is that the measure-
ments are not always conclusive, as well as manufactures and vendors may
use different ways for measuring this value.
2.4.3 Traffic Pattern Analysis
This detection technique can be quite advanced. This is also an example of
a passive detection technique, where the IDS analysis traffic and compare
this with what the IDS thinks is normal traffic behavior. This technique
usually requires advanced coding skills, as well as challenges in logistic and
statistical analysis to determine what goes under the term normal behavior.
Usually this is implemented to cope with Denial-of-Service attacks, or other
attacks that requires the attacker to be generating abnormal traffic flows in
terms of type and amount of traffic.
2.4.4 RTS/CTS Roundtrip Analysis
As shown in table 2.2, two of the control frames are called Clear-to-Send
and Request-to-Send. If this is enabled in the network, a STA will issue
a RTS frame, and wait for a CTS from the AP before transmitting data.
A detection technique called CTS/RTS Round-Trip-Time (RTT) analysis
can use this protocol specific feature in order to determine if an attack
has occurred. An IDS can calculate the time spent before it sees a RTS
frame until the CTS is received on the IDS, and see if this differs a lot from
the last time this was analyzed. In the same fashion as RSS monitoring
analysis, it can determine if a STA source address is located at two different
geographical places at the same time. Nevertheless, not all networks enable
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CTS/RTS, as a result of keeping network overhead traffic to a minimum -
including Wireless Trondheim.
2.4.5 Protocol Specific Analysis
This category of detection technique is quite vague. In short terms meaning
the general concept of looking at protocol or standard specifics to see if the
network traffic corresponds with how the protocol or standard is expected
to behave. This is best described with an example, and as we will see in
section 3.5.1, I have exploited how the 802.11 states operate by looking at
management frames originating from STAs to detect abnormalities in the
association and authentication phase of 802.11 networks.
2.5 IEEE 802.11e
802.11e is an amendent to the IEEE 802.11-2007 [1] standard. The main
principle behind 802.11e is to provide Quality of Service on 802.11 frames
between APs and STAs. This is achieved by letting the applications on the
STA inject the 802.11 frames to set a specific quality class on the frame
before it is sent to the AP. If the AP, or the wireless environment, has a
802.11e/QoS scheme enabled, it will prioritize the frames based on which
QoS class the clients STA has given his/her packets. Areas of use includes
for instance that a client can prioritize a conference call, such as Skype,
and pre-define these frames on a higher QoS class then for instance sending
a simple e-mail. This will ensure that all frames that are used for Skype
purposes will be prioritized in the wireless network, providing the user with
a smoother conference call not disturbed by less time-critical operations
such as shipping an email or downloading a file.
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2.5.1 Wireless Multimedia Management (WMM)
WMM is a Wi-Fi alliance interoperability certification, and is based on the
IEEE 802.11e amendent [12] [1]. Instead of using all eight -8- TID classes
available from the 802.11e amendent, WMM provide four different classes,
or Access Categories (AC), namely; voice, video, best effort and background.
This is reflected to 4 different combinations of TID bits, and the remaining 4
is not used. The STA application sets the TID bits accordingly to reflect the
payload of the frame, if it’s a voice, video, Best Effort or background frame.
Voice, such as Skype, has the highest priority, and next comes video, then
standard best-effort for applications that does not support or use WMM,
and finally background applications like file downloads and print jobs [12].
It is important to understand that it is the application or protocol used that
sets these priority policies and not the WMM in itself. Below are three -3-
requirements in order for WMM to be in place3:
1. the access point is Wi-Fi CERTIFIED for WMM and has WMM en-
abled;
2. the client (device) that the application is running on must be Wi-Fi
CERTIFIED for WMM;
3. the source application supports WMM
2.5.2 The QoS Control Field
As detailed in section 2.1, each 802.11 frame where the QoS subfield field is
set to -1-, has a QoS field (See table A.1). This field consists of 2 bytes, or
3List taken from http://www.smallnetbuilder.com/wireless/wireless-features/30833-
does-wi-fi-multimedia-wmm-really-do-anything-part-1
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16 bits. The first four bits are reserved for the TID subfield, and is always
used to set priority classes, or TID classes on 802.11 frames. The next fields
are used for QoS related matters. For further reading of this please review
section 7.1.3.5 in the IEEE 802.11-2007 [1]. If no QoS are used these bits are
always set to zero -0-. As a result of this there can be a total of 8 different
QoS, or TID classes per 802.11 frame. The use of QoS and 802.11e depends
on which Quality-of-service scheme offered by the STA and the network
envorinment. 802.11e simply provides a framework for Quality-of-service
on the link between STA and AP.
2.5.3 Sequence Numbers and 802.11e
As explained in 2.2, for management and data frames there exists a sequence
control field in order for the transmitting and receiving party in 802.11
environments to ensure correct delivery of MSDU or MMPDU in sequential
order. If the QoS subfield is set to zero -0- (see table A.1), and no QoS
is used, the STA keeps track of one sequence number counter for all Data
and management frames sent to the associated AP. However, if the QoS
subfield is set to one -1-, and the QoS field exists, the STA keeps track of
one sequence number counter pr TID class pr unique receiver. This is of high
importance in this master thesis, and the problems described in section 1.2
and 3.2 is a direct result of this. There also exist another wrapping counter
for management frames and QoS data frames with a broadcast/multicast
address in the Address 1 field, as well as all non-QoS data frames sent by
QoS STAs.
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2.6 The Physical Layer
Even though this thesis primarily focus on the data link-layer and MAC
layer - layer 2 in the OSI Reference Model provided in figure 2.1, I will
give a brief introduction to measurements of RSS values on the physical
layer. RSSI stands for Received Signal Strength Indication, and is a value
measuring the power in a received signal. The calculations of this value are
vendor specific, and are unit less in the range from 0 to 255. The max value
is also vendor specific, where i.e. Cisco cards range the RSSI value from
0-100, and for instance Atheros4 range from 0 - 127. The value is acquired
on the receiving STA from the preamble frame of 802.11 frames, which is
attached on the frame before the actual 802.11 MAC frame from figure 2.2
is sent. For more in-depth theory and analysis of RSS, please refer to the
master thesis by Øystein Aas Pedersen provided in [7].
4Atheros is a developer of semiconductor system solutions for wireless and other net-
working products.
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Method
With all the background theory in place, I will in this chapter show my
methods of choice in developing an Intrusion Detection System. The chapter
will start by defining a proper threat model. This is important in order to
understand to which threats we are trying to protect against. Further, in
section 3.2, I will go in to detail on how QoS optimized attack work in theory,
as well as describing them with a simple scenario. As stated in section 1.5.2,
this thesis will keep strong focus on the proposed solutions and algorithm
from [3], and I will in section 3.3 go in to detail on these. How SIDS v2.0
was developed, and which enhancements the system provides in contrast
to the proposed algorithm are provided in sections 3.4 and 3.5. Finally, in
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section 3.6, I will describe how I created different scenarios to test SIDS
v2.0 on.
3.1 Threat Model
In order to understand what we are trying to protect us against, it is im-
portant to define a proper threat model. In this section I will provide a
threat framework to highlight the threats which I will consider in this the-
sis, and briefly discuss which threats I am not considering. Recapping back
to section 2.2, the attacks on 802.11 environments can be extensive, and
some quite advanced. We must define an attacker in terms of motive, skills,
know-how and equipment, as well as look into the actual network which
needs protection. The lab setup from the project assignment from 2009 are
provided in figure 3.1. As stated in the introduction of this thesis, this net-
work is a replica of the CUWN network Wireless Trondheim has deployed
in the city of Trondheim. The wired part of the network should be secured
by locks and physical access, and the amount of work needed to gain access
from the internet to the administrating network should be highly extensive.
Thus, I will only consider the following concerning network access:
(1) Network The wired network is considered secure, where the wireless
network is not.
This means, that in figure 3.1, I will consider threats on LAP1 and
LAP2, as well as wireless STAs. Further we need to define the attacker in
matters of motive, skills, know-how and equipment. As described in the
introduction, an attackers motive to carry out an attack in these types of
network can be for self-pleasure, or in a worse case perform illegal actions
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Figure 3.1: The lab setup
masquerading a legitimate and innocent clients credentials. (I.e. download-
ing of illegal content, such as child-pornography). The motive could also
be for own satisfaction in regards to be able to fool an advanced intrusion
detection system.
(2) Motive The attacker’s motive is to spoof a legitimate identity, and
use his or her credentials to access the network and internet.
In terms of skills, we must define how much work and skill-set the at-
tacker possesses accordingly to the motive behind the attack. It is reason-
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able to conclude, that the personal selfish gain from just penetrating an
open 802.11 wireless network should be low for an attacker with high level
of skills. Nevertheless, as a more sophisticated intrusion detection systems
are deployed, the credit gained by fooling the IDS should be also considered.
As we will see in section 3.6.2, MAC freeloader attacks are in its simplest
form, and easy to carry out. So this should be our first type of attacker.
The second one could be of an attacker that wants to bypass the system as
a proof-of-concept, or to frame a client or perform illegal actions on the net.
(3) Skills The common attacker has the skills to carry out a MAC freeloader
attack, and understand the basics behind the 802.11 protocol. I Will also
consider a more advanced attacker, whose goal is to bypass the system, with
thorough understanding of 802.11 wireless networks and Intrusion Detection
Systems.
As described in section 2.2, I will consider two types of attacks in
this thesis, namely eavesdropping(2.2.1) and masquerading(2.2.2) attacks.
Eavesdropping is a simple gesture, but important in an attackers perspective
to gain knowledge of clients, network topology and parameters. Masquerad-
ing the clients STA in open 802.11 networks is a matter of simply changing
the MAC address to that of the legitimate client. A combination of these two
attacks can result in a MAC freeloader attack, and the equipment needed
for this is a simple laptop with a wireless network card.
(4) Equipment The attacker has limited access to advanced equipment.
A laptop with a wireless NIC is considered.
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3.2 QoS optimized Attack
As briefly explained in the introduction section 1.2, an advanced attacker
can fool the detection system by exploiting how the Intrusion Detection
System cope with the QoS problems described earlier. As described in the
theory chapter 2 section 2.5, 802.11e use -8- TID QoS classes, and the STA
keeps one sequence counter for each of these classes. The first problem with
this approach is that IDS based on standard MAC Sequence Counting can’t
distinguish between the different counters for each class, thus not being able
to detect which sequence number originates from the legitimate STA, and a
potential attacker. It is reasonable to believe that the IDS can counter this
by looking at the TID bits in each frame, and keep one counter for each
QoS class read, and as a result of this trigger alarms when one or more of
the independent -8- sequence counters jumps between values.
The Attack However, if an attacker analyses which TID bits that are in
use by the legitimate STA (Usually none or only a few combinations as we
will see in section 6.1), it can inject his/her frames to simply use one or more
of the other classes not used by the legit clients STA. This will result in the
detection system again not being able to distinguish which frame belongs to
the client and a potential attacker. This is a result of the IDS observing a
standard MAC sequence counter increase in a specific TID class, and there
is no way to understand that it was in fact an attacker masquerading as the
proper clients STA using this TID class.
Simple Scenario The explanation above may be difficult to understand;
so I will further try to explain this with a simple scenario. We can think
of Alice as a legitimate client surfing the web with an iPhone, on a bus,
41
CHAPTER 3. METHOD
through TrT’s network. In this case she only uses Safari on her iPhone
surfing the web. On a café nearby sits Bob. He has installed Wireshark,
and is analyzing 802.11 frames that are sent in the clear on the network. Bob
sees Alice’s MAC address, and sees that all frames from Alice are marked
with TID bits 000 - Best Effort. Bob spoofs Alice MAC address, and follows
a standard MAC Freeloader attack as explained in Ørjans master thesis [13].
As Bob has quite the skills, he uses iptables1 on his Linux distribution to
make sure that every frame sent from his laptop is marked as TID class
010 (Video). Further, Bob, uses his newly achieved connection on TrT’s
network to issue an attack on a highly important mainframe somewhere.
The IDS did not trigger an attack, as it believed that Alice simply was
streaming video content. Alice now has to take blame for Bob’s actions.
3.3 Proposed Algorithm For QoS Considered De-
tection
The algorithm proposed by [3] is given below, and suggests new techniques
as a counter to the attacks described above. The work done by developing
SIDS v2.0 uses the ideas and structure of this algorithm. As SIDS grew
and became more advanced during the writing of this master, I found it
necessary to structure the IDS in a more programmer friendly fashion. As a
result of this I used the algorithm from [3] as a starting point for developing
SIDS v2.0, and divided the algorithm into several steps, or blocks, to easy
compare the intrusion detection system to the algorithm itself and explana-
tions given in this thesis. These steps are given as functions, or subroutines,
1iptables is a user space application program that allows a system administrator to
configure the tables provided by the Linux kernel firewall and the chains and rules it
stores
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in SIDS, as I will show in section 3.4.
Algorithm : Find−Ident i ty−Spoofs
Input : S : Sequence o f w i r e l e s s packets
Output : Attack/No_Attack
MACs = l i s t o f MAC sequence numbers in S ;
i f MACs in l i n e a r p rog r e s s i on then
return No_Attack ;
else i f MAC va r i a t i o n in va l i d range then
return No Attack ;
/∗ MAC sequences not in l i n e a r
p r og r e s s i on ; check frame types ∗/
FTypes = frame types ex t rac t ed from S ;
i f FTypes 2 {Management , Regular Data} then
return Attack ;
/∗ Frame type must be QoS−Data ; examine
p r i o r i t i e s ∗/
QoS−P r i o r i t i e s = QoS p r i o r i t i e s ex t rac t ed from S ;
i f QoS−P r i o r i t i e s are a l l the same then
return Attack ;
/∗ QoS p r i o r i t i e s are e i t h e r mixed , or
mixed QoS−data and r egu l a r data ∗/
Perform d i f f e r e n t i a l l o c a l i z a t i o n for packets in S ;
i f Eucl idean d i s t ance between s u c c e s s i v e packets exceeds
th r e sho ld then
return Attack ;
return No_Attack ;
Listing 3.1: Proposed algorithm for QoS considered identity spoof detection
To understand the algorithm itself, as well as relate the work done on
SIDS v2.0 to the algorithm, I have sub-divided the algorithm into several
steps. In this section I will give an in-depth analysis of the algorithm as pro-
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posed by [3], and show how I implemented it in SIDS v2.0. I will also show
my new thinking and methods to optimize the IDS. Below I have given an
overview of the different steps, and from step 2a to 2d, SIDS does not differ
from the proposed algorithm from [3]. We will see that instead of relying on
parameters from the physical layer, I will propose techniques which exploit
features in how the 802.11 protocol operates. This will be further described
in section 3.5.2. I will also propose another passive technique, which I have
called 802.11 state control, which is not directly related to the work done by
[3], but should be a good extra detection technique as I will further discuss
in section 5.1.1.
3.3.1 Initial step
MACs = list of MAC sequence numbers in S
First we want to keep a sequence of wireless packets; this should be the
input to the IDS. Second we keep a list of different parameters for each STA
connected to our wireless environment, sorted uniquely by MAC addresses.
3.3.2 Step 2a
if MACs in linear progression then
return No_attack;
This, together with Step 2b, is what most IDS based on MAC Sequence
Counting are capable of doing. If the MAC sequence numbers are not linear,
it will return an attack alarm for the specific MAC address. This step just
verifies if all the sequence numbers originating from the same MAC source
44
3.3. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR QOS CONSIDERED
DETECTION
address are increasing by one -1-, and concludes no attack if this is the case.
To cope with the QoS problems discussed in chapter 1, section 1.2, this
algorithm does not conclude an attack yet, and eventually jumps to step
2c. First a quick look at Step 2b.
3.3.3 Step 2b
else if MAC variation in valid range then
return No_Attack;
As known, wireless packets can be lost, and as many wIDS are deployed
to operate as passive detection systems, there can be frames that made it to
their intended destination, but the IDS itself was not capable of picking up
the frame. This will result in gaps in the sequence number analysis, and the
algorithm must take this into consideration. Therefore it also concludes that
no attack is occurring if the sequence numbers gaps are within an approved
threshold. If this is not the case, it will further jump to Step 2c. Recapping
to our work in the project assignment 2009, I will set this threshold offset
to five -5- [2].
3.3.4 Step 2c
if FTypes is Management or Regular Data then
return Attack;
If we are on step 2c, we know with certainty that the frames from this
MAC address are not in linear progression. If the frames are not QoS Data,
and they are in fact normal management or data frames, we may assume
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that an attack has occurred. Recapping back to section 2.5 it is only if QoS
are used on the frames were we could potentially see different TID classes,
and variations in the sequence number higher than of the normal threshold
set in step 2b. Therefore we can conclude that an attack has in fact taken
place if the sequence numbers are more offset than the approved threshold,
as well as the frames are not of type QoS or control frames as explained in
2.1.2.
3.3.5 Step 2d
if QoS-Priorites are all the same then
return Attack;
At this stage we know that the frames are not in linear progression, as
well as type QoS. If QoS are enabled on the network, the frames could still
be marked as QoS frames as explained in 2.1.2, and therefore the algorithm
must verify if this is in fact the case. It will check to see if QoS is enabled by
the network, but not used. In this specific case, all TID bits in the 802.11
frame are set to zero -0-, and one will conclude an attack in the same fashion
as in Step 2c.
3.3.6 Step 2e
if Euclidean distance between
successive packets exceeds treshold then
return Attack;
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At this stage, we know that the QoS priorities, or TID classes, are
either mixed, or we have mixed QoS-data and regular data within the same
sequence. At this stage many IDS based on MAC Sequence Counting are
confused, overwhelming the administrator or log file with false positives of
an ongoing attack - including SIDS v1.0! The reason for this is that, as
mentioned in 2.5, the STA keep track of one sequence number per TID
channel, and if the IDS does not keep track of the TID channels together
with the sequence numbers it will become useless as described in section
3.2.
This is where everything gets more interesting. As the algorithm pro-
poses, they will use Euclidean distance to verify if an attack is indeed on-
going. These calculations heavily rely on utilizing physical parameters. As
these parameters are unreliable in mobile environments, and has yet to be
proven as a good detection technique, I will propose new thinking in the
areas of how to increase the reliability of the algorithm from [3], by not
relying on physical parameters, but exploiting features of the 802.11 proto-
col. In section 3.5.2 I will show a real-time dependent technique known as
active probing, using ICMP packets to verify if a freeloader attack indeed
is ongoing. I will also in section 3.5.1 exploit how the 802.11 protocol oper-
ates, by constantly analyzing and listening to specific management frames
to check if two STAs are communicating with an AP at the same time.
Before I go into detail, I will first show how SIDS v2.0 is programmed to
suit the algorithm from [3], and then show how these new techniques are
implemented in SIDS v2.0. In chapter 6 "Analytic Detection Techniques" I
will elaborate on other types of detection which could be an enhancement
to the techniques implemented below.
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3.4 Developing SIDS v2.0
SIDS v2.0 is developed for experimental purposes at this stage. During
the writing of this master thesis, I have used SIDS as a testing framework
for new techniques to analyze the behavior when the script was executed
on the same oﬄine cap files every time. As explained in 3.3, SIDS v2.0
was programmed according to the algorithm from section 3.3. The main
program, known as sidsv2.pl provided in B.1, has primarily three functions;
1. It does the actual frame sniffing. 2. it calls an external perl script if
it calculates that a frame sequence check is necessary, and 3. keeps track
of management frames as I will elaborate on in section 3.5.1. SIDS is able
to perform package sniffing in both oﬄine and online mode. To test new
techniques and methods and get comparable results, I have performed all
of my testing in an oﬄine mode. This means that I have used hardware
equipment meant for SIDS to do the actual sniffing of packets, creating
oﬄine capture files. 2. To keep good track of things, I have used the same
oﬄine capture files every time as shown in the Results chapter 4.
The sequence length of MAC frames to keep before performing a check
is really up to the administrator of the network. As I performed all my
measurements in oﬄine mode, I just set the sequence to 55 000 packets,
approximately the length of a 20 minutes CAP file. (Of course filtered on
only one specific BSSID, as well as on only QoS, Management and Data
frames). In a real-time running of the program I recon this number to be
set somewhere between 100 - 500, though not tested and verified. For each
frame intended for the specific AP to be monitored, a few parameters about
the frame are written to a file on the disk stored as "<sourcemac>.check",
2CAP files are files that are formatted to keep 802.11 frames, i.e. readable by Wire-
shark. www.wireshark.org
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namely:
• The source MAC address;
• The MAC sequence number;
• Frametype;
• Subtype;
• TID bits - three bits;
• Timestamp in milliseconds;
• Timestamp in seconds
When 55 000 frames are written to the file with these parameters,
sidsv2.pl calls another script called check.pl, asking for the script to check to
see if the parameters are good according to the algorithm from section 3.3.
This means that sidsv2.pl can keep on sniffing frames, and not keep track
of all the different checks at all times, but call his "child script" check.pl if
it finds it suitable. In simple terms, there is always one instance of sidsv2.pl
running, but there can be many check.pl running at the same time.
sidsv2.pl third job is to keep track of specific management frames, and
perform analysis on these in a state machine fashion, as I will show in
section 3.5.1. This is a new feature not discussed by [3], but as we will
see in the results chapter give good results as an extra freeloader detection
technique in Intrusion Detection Systems. Combining different techniques
will improve the quality of the detection mechanism, and add reliability to
the system in regards to both false negatives and false positives. More on
this in chapter5-
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3.4.1 check.pl
As explained above, sidsv2.pl will call instances of check.pl when enough
frames are picked up from the same source MAC address and a check is
required. check.pl is implemented to suit the proposed algorithm described
in 3.3, and is thus divided into subroutines for each step. Step a and b are
performed in the same subroutine named check_linprog. We can see by
the code below that it will increase an alarm counter with one -1- if the
offset between the sequence number from the testing frame is more than
-5- times greater than the previous frame. It also verifies that the MAC
sequence counter is not looping around 4095 to avoid false alarm triggers as
explained in 2.1.2.
i f ( ($SEQ − $OLD > 5) && ($OLD != 4095) && ($SEQ != 4095) ) {
$counter = $counter+1;
}
It will proceed with Step 2c, called check_frtypes, if the counter has
more than 5 hits3. If not, it will delete the file "<sourcemac>.check", and
drop further testing. The instance of check.pl will then terminate.
The check_frtypes subroutine simply checks to see if the subtype bit
of QoS are set, as well as verify that the frame is not a control frame.
Control frames do not carry MAC sequence numbers, and should therefore
not be considered here. If the frames are not of type QoS, then we can
conclude that an attack has been carried out. If not, we must proceed to
check if we have equal QoS priority on all frames, hence call the subroutine
check_priority (step 2D).
3These parameters are due to change, and should be carefully considered and tested
if SIDS is to be deployed
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i f ( ($FRT == ("11" | | "01" ) && QOSBIT == "0" ) {
my $logmsg = "Step 2c − Attack on Source MAC: $MAC" ;
write_log ( $logmsg ) ;
} else {
equa l_pr i o r i ty ( $ f i l e ) ;
}
The subroutine function equal_priority simply checks if all TID bits
are the same for every package. If this is the case, QoS are enabled on
the network, but not used by the STA as explained in section 3.3.5. If the
TID bits are different, check.pl knows that the sequence of frames from this
MAC is either mixed TID bits, or we have mixed TID bits -and- regular Data
Frames. Now there is a possibility that a freeloader attack has occurred,
but this should be verified. In the next section I will propose enhancements
and new methods to verify a potential attack if QoS are enabled and used
by the client. (Or the attacker)
3.5 Enhancements in SIDS v2.0
To cope with the problems using unreliable physical parameters, I have im-
plemented and tested two new techniques in SIDS v2.0. The first, 802.11
State Control, is not directly related to the proposed algorithm from above,
but should be a good extra detection technique in Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems. The second, Active Probing, is implemented in Step 2e, and has
replaced the recipe from [3] where they suggest calculating Eucledian dis-
tance to verify the attack.
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Figure 3.2: Valid (blue) and Invalid (red) Managament Frames in 802.11
states
3.5.1 Passive Detection - 802.11 State Control
As described in section 2.1.3, 802.11 operates with different states when
an AP and STA is to be connected. 802.11-2007 [1] defines three different
states. In this section I will show how I implemented a state approach in
SIDS to enhance detection of freeloader attacks. This method use the ideas
provided by Jason Smith [5] as described in chapter I section 1.5.
In section 2.1.3 I explained how the 802.11 protocol defines different
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states when a STA wants to associate and authenticate with a correspond-
ing AP. If we define the management frames in figure 2.4 as valid frames,
the state transitions from the figure is what I wall from now define as nor-
mal behavior. This means that the transitions in the figure are expected
Management Frames messages one should see when a legit STA is commu-
nicating with an AP. Nevertheless, in a freeloader attack, the behavior of
the state machine is radically changed.
In figure 3.2, the transitions marked with red are frames originating
from a MAC address which should not be sent due to the way the 802.11
states operates. For instance, if a legit STA is in state 3; authenticated
and associated, one should not see an authentication or association frame
originating from the STA. It is important to understand that if for some
reason the STA gets disassociated, it will send a re-association message in
state 2, and not a standard association message. Also note that if a STA
gets de-authenticated, it must also send an authentication message before
it can send an associate message.
As a result of this, one should not see an authenticate message in state 2,
nor should one not see authentication or association messages when in state
3. These transitions are marked with red in figure 3.2. Table 3.1 will give
an overview over which frames are allowed and which is not as described
above.
As described in section 3.4, sidsv2.pl analyze management frames, and
keep track of the different states for each STA communicating with the AP.
There exists a hash map, which keeps the states of each MAC address that
has been or is communicating with the AP. The states can be set to 00, 01
or 11, accordingly to figure 2.4. For each packet processed, the script will
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State Valid frames Invalid frames
State 1
Authentication Association Request
Deauthentication Reassociation Request
Disassociation
State 2
Association Request Disassociation
Reassociation request Authentication Request
Deauthenticate
State 3 Deauthenticate Association RequestDisassociation Authentication Request
Table 3.1: Valid and invalid management frames in 802.11 states
filter on Management Frames, and if one of the 7 following subtypes is seen,
it will trigger an analysis of the event:
• Association Request;
• Association Response;
• Reassociation Request;
• Reassociation Response;
• Disassociation;
• Authentication;
• Deauthentication
If one of these messages are seen, SIDS will verify if the message is of a
valid frame according to that state as detailed in table 3.1. It will first read
that it is in fact a Management Frame, check the subtype bits to see if it is
any of the above, and finally verify if the specific frame is expected according
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to the state the STA is in. If the frame is a valid one, it will update the
STAs state to the new correct one, i.e. receiving a Deauthentication frame
in state 11, would correspond to setting the new state to 00 (see figure 3.2).
If the transition is not valid, it will write to a log file "/var/log/sids" with
the time of the event, and what happened. An example of the code analysis
for Authentication frames are given below:
# Authent ica t ion check
i f ( $subtype == "1011" ) {
i f ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == ("11" or "01" ) ) {
my $logmsg = "$src_id a l r eady authent i ca ted " ;
write_log ( $logmsg ) ;
} e l s i f ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == "00" ) {
$mac_state{ $src_mac } = "01" ;
}
}
Here you can see that upon receiving a frame type 00 and subtype
1011, which according to table A.1 is an Authenticate Management Frame,
SIDS will first verify if the state of this specific MAC adress is set to be in
either "11" or "01" (State 1 and 2 accordingly). If this is not the case it
will call write_log telling the log file that the MAC address was already
authenticated when receiving an Authenticate message. Otherwise it will
set the correct state for the STA.
3.5.2 Active Detection - Active Probing
This enhancement relate directly to how the algorithm from section 3.3 is
build up. As RSS meassurements are not always reliable, I have chosen a
new technique to verify if an QoS optimized attack really is ongoing. This
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technique cannot be performed oﬄine, but is real-time dependent. Until
now, we have only seen examples of passive detection techniques. Passive
Detection techniques does not actively participate in the network. In all
of our cases above, SIDS has been standing explicitly as a passive node,
monitoring and analyzing 802.11 frames. The advantage of this is that one
does not need to interfere with the current infrastructure of the network, but
we can place monitoring nodes next to the serving network. As everything
in our example are using wireless technologies, one could conclude that we
do not need more configuring then a simple wireless NIC and a power outlet
to set up SIDS on a node somewhere.
Nevertheless, passive monitoring has its limits. If we want to make sure
that an attack has occurred, it can be of good fashion to actively participate
in the network by trigger and challenge different nodes in order to analyze
the response of the event. This is what is called active probing. The IDS can
be a part of the backbone network, and has access to trigger events in order
to challenge STAs associated with the AP. The idea behind the probing is to
verify that the challenge response from the STAs is what should be expected
if no attack is ongoing. If in fact a freeloader attack is being performed,
active probing can help the IDS reveal and verify the attack, where both
the legit STA and the attacking STA may answer to challenges.
PING - Using ICMP Echoes And Replies In figure 3.3 I have showed
the principle behind a simple active probing detection event. Here, I use
ICMP echoes and ICMP replies to check whether two responses are seen
when issuing a PING request from inside the network. If we recap back
to section 3.3, we can implement active probing techniques in Step 2E,
where a potential attack should be verified. For instance, if SIDS has one
wireless NIC analyzing frames according to the description in section 3.4,
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and one NIC facing towards the backbone of the monitoring network, it
can trigger PING packets to the specified IP address if it wants to verify
if a QoS-enhanced attack is occurring. It will send a PING packet 4 from
the wired interface, into the backbone network with the STA’s IP address
as destination. This packet will, due to the logic of network topology, find
its way through the Wireless LAN Controller, and to the AP serving the
STA’s, and finally be sent as an ICMP echo frame to the wireless STA. STAs
NICs usually reply to ICMP echoes in form of ICMP REPLY packets. If an
attacker has spoofed the IP address of the client, it is likely that both the
legit STA and the attacking STA will send ICMP reply packet back to the
AP, and to the IDS cabled interface again. The IDS can at this point both
analyze the receiving packets from the cabled network, as well as analyze
ICMP frames from the same MAC address. If it sees duplicate ICMP reply
packet, it can log the event.
3.6 Attacking And Generating Oﬄine Capture Files
As I wanted to test different techniques and get good comparable results, I
decided that it was a good manner to create oﬄine capture files capturing
different scenarios. These recordings were of course done on the hardware
meant to be running the IDS. First I needed to set the wireless NIC in
monitor mode, in order for the NIC to act as a passive monitoring node.
This is done by issuing:
sudo iwconfig wlan0 mode monitor channel 6
4Read about PING at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ping
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Figure 3.3: Active Probing using ICMP packets to verify freeloader attacks
This will set the wireless interface wlan0 into monitor mode, and it will
thus not participate in any network, but act as a passive monitoring device.
It will listen to all WLAN traffic on channel 6. Airodump-ng5 was used to
capture frames, and was issued in the following:
airodump-ng -w <name>.cap
--channel 6 --bssid 00:23:5D:0D:FB:F0 wlan0
5Airodump-ng is used for packet capturing of raw 802.11 frames
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The Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID) is the MAC address of the AP
to be monitored, and is a good filter when acting as a passive node. The
AP is operating on channel 6, and the interface which should be used for
sniffing is wlan0. All files below were created according to this recipe.
3.6.1 NoAttack.cap
This file was created for verification purposes in order to test different tech-
niques when no attack or abnormalities were occurring in the network. This
capture is a 20 minute record, and has captured a scenario where different
STAs log on and off the wireless network, as well as generating traffic and
browsing the internet, as most open 802.11 wireless operates. The follow-
ing STA’s were authenticated, associated and used sporadically during the
record :
• Apple MacBook Pro;
• Apple iPhone;
• HTC Magic;
• Windows 7 - Hewlet Packard;
• Ubuntu 9.10 - IBM;
The purpose behind this record is to have a test file to check for false
positives when testing new techniques. None of the detection techniques
described in section 3.4 and 3.5 should trigger alarms on this capture file,
as I made sure that no attack or abnormalities were issued during the record.
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3.6.2 FreeloaderAttack.cap
In the same matter as in section 3.6.1, this capture file was generated
throughout a 20 minute timeframe. The scenario, however, was somewhat
different. All the devices from the list above were connected from the start,
except the IBM laptop running Ubuntu 9.10. After 10 minutes, a freeloader
attack was generated to freeload on the Apple Macbook Pro’s legit connec-
tion to the network.
The attack was carried out in the same fashion as explained in Ørjan
Bækkelund’s master thesis from 2008 [13]. To goal behind this task was
not to give another proof of concept for a freeloader attack, but to create a
capture file with a MAC freeloader attack to test on. The attack is detailed
in the master from Ørjan Bækkelund [13], chapter 3, section 3.3.
3.6.3 FreeloaderPING.cap
In order to test and verify the passive detection technique concept from
3.5.2, I also generated a third capture file. This is also a 20 minute record
and is quite similar to the one above. The difference is, that during the
attack, I issued a
ping 10.0.0.22 -c 3
from the IDS. Three PING packets, or ICMP request packets, was sent
out on the cable interface eth0, and I got successful pinging as an output in
the console from the IDS whenever the ICMP packet went through. More
on this in the subsequent chapter, section 4.3.
In the next chapter we will see the results when testing SIDS on these
capture files, and further discuss my findings in chapter 5.
60
4
Results
This chapter will show the results when testing new detection techniques,
as well as SIDS v2.0 in various scenarios and settings. The chapter will first
verify the problem with SIDS v1.0, and how the IDS was not optimized to
deal with the 802.11e problems from section 1.5.2. Further I will present the
results when SIDS v2.0 was optimized with the new detection techniques
as proposed in section 3.5. Finally, in section 4.4 I will briefly elaborate on
other results in which I found was interesting according to the outline of
this thesis.
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4.1 SIDS
In chapter 3, section 3.3 and 3.4 I showed how SIDS was implemented
accordingly to the structure from the proposed algorithm in [3]. The new
features in SIDS was tested in the same matter as in our project of 2009
- using the Wireless Trondheim testing lab, based on a typical CUWN
provided in figure 3.11. In my testing setup, I had one LAP connected to the
network, and used this for analysis of STAs associated to the access point.
As the lab already was set up to replicate the wireless network of Wireless
Trondheim from before, I had more time experimenting and testing different
techniques. The IDS and the lab was set up directly according to the project
of 2009, given in figure 3.1. SIDS was tested on the IDS server "Rybak"
from the figure 3.1, and it was also upgraded with a wireless NIC to act as
the Wireless monitoring node listening on frames with destination address
for the AP as explained in 3.4. As the physical location of the IDS/Rybak
was approximately 50cm away from LAP1, I did not have problems with
losing frames in the IDS that was picked up by the LAP. Even with 55 000
frames processed by the IDS, it was only 3 MAC Sequence Number offsets
as a result of losing frames. This, of course, may have affected my results
in a positive matter in contrary to a real-world testing of the techniques,
but as I will explain here and in chapter 5, the new techniques should be
suitable in an urban environments as well.
4.1.1 MAC Sequence Counting Analysis from SIDS v1.0
First of all, I wanted to test the rate of false positives when no attack
was carried out. I used SIDS v1.0 from our project assignment 2009 to
1See the project in [2] for further details on this
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test standard MAC Sequence Counting Analysis without optimizing it to
deal with the new features of 802.11e/WMM. First, I disabled WMM on the
Wireless LAN Controller, and verified that SIDS v1.0 did not trigger alarms
when executing the script live on several devices in my lab. No alarms were
set off. After this I carried out a standard MAC freeloader attack on the
MacBook pro, and the IDS wrote to the log file almost at an instant that
a freeloader attack had occurred. At this stage nothing new in regards to
our project assignment from 2009.
WMM enabled As WMM was enabled when issuing the record files from
3.6, I did not have to test the IDS in a live system. I executed SIDS v1.0 on
NoAttack.cap, and the log file was overwhelmed with alarms that freeloader
attacks had occurred. I also executed it on FreeloaderAttack.cap, but there
was no way for me to see from the log file which alarms that where correct,
and which was a false. This verifies that SIDS v1.0 becomes useless when
enabling Quality-of-Service on the link-layer in the network.
4.2 SIDS v2.0 - Passive Detection
In this section I will show the results of implementing a passive detection
mechanism, which I called 802.11 state control. In my Theory chapter 2
section 2.1.3 I explained how 802.11 STA and AP’s operate with 3 different
states for each STA communicating with an AP. After implementation of
code as detailed in 3.5.1, I tested this technique on the two of the cap files
from section 3.6.
No Attack To verify the rate of false positives, I executed SIDS v2.0 on
NoAttack.cap from section 3.6.1. During this 20 minute record, SIDS v2.0
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did not state that a single attack was executed, in contrary to v1.0. As SIDS
v2.0 distinguish between TID classes, the log file did not get overwhelmed
with false positives.
Freeloader Attack Second, I executed SIDS v2.0 on FreeloaderAttack.cap
from section 3.6.2. As you can see from figure 4.1, the IDS successfully trig-
gered on the freeloader attack. As explained in section 2.1.3, it is standard
for a STA to first issue an authenticate message, and then an associate
message when connecting to an AP. From the figure we can see that SIDS
triggered two alarms during the freeloader attack. As the legit STA was
already authenticated and associated, SIDS triggered an alarm when the
attacking STA issued an authenticate request, as well as on the association
request straight afterwards. As the STA was already proper associated with
the AP before the freeloader attack was carried out, I had to manually set
the state machine in SIDS to set the proper STA as already in state two
-2- before the record began. Otherwise I would have experienced false neg-
atives, as the authentication and association from the attacking STA would
simply just update the state machine in SIDS from state -0- to -2-, implying
that a legit STA was associating - not triggering attacks.
This means that we can see from figure 4.1, that SIDS is able to detect
when new STA’s connect to an AP, masquerading the legit STA’s MAC
and IP address. As we will see from my discussion section 5.1.1 on page
72, it is very difficult for an attacker to bypass this detection and it would
require an advanced set of skills in order for the wireless NIC to not send
authenticate and association messages when connecting to an AP.
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Figure 4.1: Result of running Passive Detection on FreeloaderAttack.cap -
802.11 state control
4.3 SIDS v2.0 - Active Detection
As en enhancement of detection of freeloader attacks, I suggested using
Active Probing as a detection technique as described in section 3.5.2. As a
proof of concept, I implemented an example of active probing, namely ICMP
echo/ICMP reply. The basics behind this detection technique is to probe the
STA with an ICMP Request packet (Or PING as more commonly referred
to), and check if the STA responds two identical ICMP reply packets. This
is a fairly easy technique, and as we will see below, it can easily be avoided
by an attacker. However, as I will discuss in section 5.1.2, other types of
probing techniques can be used, and experiments on TCP SYN probing and
other probing techniques should be looked into. Nevertheless, as a proof of
concept, this technique had good results when experimenting with different
STA’s, and as one can see from figure 4.2, the IDS received two duplicate
ICMP replies when issuing a ping request during a freeloader attack.
This is also included in SIDS, were sidsv2.pl constantly is checking
whether there is written an file named <ip-adress>.check on the disk. If
this is the case, sidsv2.pl knows that check.pl has issued a probe request,
and will check if duplicate ICMP frames are received from that IP address.
As this has to be performed live, i.e. not on capture files, I just verified in
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Figure 4.2: Duplicate ICMP replies in FreeloaderAttackPING.cap
Wireshark that the capture file indeed captured two identical ICMP echo
replies a shown in figure 4.2. This figure shows a part of the FreeloaderP-
ING.cap from section 3.6.3 filtered on the ICMP protocol.
After this, I tested several devices, and as we will see in the following
subsection, there were inconsistent results due to firewall issues.
4.3.1 Firewalls
The FreeloaderPING.cap is a record when issued a PING request on a Mac-
intosh running OS X Snow Leopard2 as the legit STA, and Ubuntu 9.10
as the attacking STA. In this scenario, there were no firewalls enabled on
either of the devices. As a result of this, I obtained successful detection, as
both computers answered the ICMP request.
Nevertheless, as I wanted to test the technique using different Operating
2Apple’s newest Operating System
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System (OS)s, I also tried a freeloader attack on a STA running Windows 7.
As windows 7 has a default firewall rule not to answer on ping (see chapter5,
section 5.1.2 for details), only the attacking STA running Ubuntu 9.10 in
this case answered the request, and I did not have a successful detection of
the attack.
The result of this, as you might understand, that for an attacker to
avoid this detection technique, it is as simple as setting up a simple firewall
not responding to ICMP, or PING, requests. Nevertheless, as we will see in
section 5.1.2, this is just a proof-of-concept, and other techniques might be
used as described in section 8.1.
I also verified a few other devices to find out which one has firewall
enabled by default, and from the list below, only Windows 7 dropped the
PING request.
• Apple MacBook Pro;
• Apple iPhone;
• HTC Magic;
• Windows 7 - Hewlet Packard;
• Ubuntu 9.10 - IBM;
4.4 WMM enabled
When experimenting with SIDS, I also came across several results which I
found interesting. In this section I will look at a spesific result that could
be of interest in order to detect if a QoS attack is performed. Figure 4.3
is a screenshot of Wireshark, where the packet is marked with the appli-
cation SSH. This was captured when WMM was enabled on the network,
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and as you can clearly see from the figure, SSH sessions are marked as
"Background" classification as explained in section 2.5.1. This matter will
be further analyzed in chapter 6 on page 77.
Figure 4.3: SSH packets flagges with background WMM classification
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SIDS v2.0
In this chapter I will look at how my methods of choice provided in chapter
3 suits the results gained from chapter 4. I will start by looking at SIDS
as an Intrusion Detection System, and analyze the results provided in the
previous chapter. The chapter will also in section 5.2 discuss where SIDS
stands to act as a complete detection system.
5.1 Implemented Detection Techniques in SIDS v2.0
In chapter 3 section 3.5 I implemented two new type of techniques in SIDS.
The first, Passive Detection, use 802.11 protocol specifics in order to deter-
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mine that a freeloader attack is ongoing. It is of importance to understand,
as I described in section 3.1, that this detection technique only detects at-
tacks of type Freeloader as described in section 3.2. If an attacker decides
to wait for the STA to drop off from the network before the attack is carried
out, the attack is known as a session hijacking attack, and will become much
more advanced to discover. Nevertheless, in order to detect freeloader at-
tack, this detection technique can be quite tricky to avoid from an attackers
perspective as we will see in a moment.
The second technique is an active one. This basically means that it
will actively probe associated STA’s in order to analyze the outcome of the
request to verify if an attack is occurring. This is described in section 3.5.2,
and results in the IDS having to be a part of the backbone network of some
sort.1 This specific implementation is barely meant as a proof-of-concept,
and as we will see in 5.1.2, that from an attackers perspective, this specific
detection technique using ICMP can easily be avoided by simply enabling
a firewall rule in the OS. As I will discuss soon, there should be other
techniques that is suitable for this type of scenario, and as stated before,
the more detection techniques the IDS is capable of performing, the higher
the possibility is for discovering attacks.
5.1.1 Exploiting 802.11 states
The theory behind 802.11 states are given in 2.1.3. As the 802.11 states are
defined and given in the 802.11-2007 standard provided in [1], manufactures
and vendors strongly embed this into the Wireless NIC’s or the software
drivers of their cards. It is a part of the way that 802.11 operate, with no
exceptions. One might think that the attacker simply could re-program the
1This may not be true if the active probing is done through the wireless NIC from the
IDS
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drivers not to participate in 802.11 states by excluding management frames
meant to associate and authenticate to the network. The fact of the matter
is, that these drivers are often quite advanced in terms of programming,
and due to the fact that the 802.11 protocol works this way, there should
be an extensive amount of work on re-programming the drivers in order
to optimize the freeloader attack to bypass the detection system. This is
in fact possible, but the amount of work programming each driver could
potentially be enormous, and perhaps not worth it. Nevertheless, as we
have seen before in the security community, if one person does all the hard
work, it is simple to distribute the drivers through the internet. I have not
looked into the detail of work needed to re-program the drivers, but it is
reasonable to believe that it should be a lot of logical challenges as well as
strong programming skills in order to bypass the way 802.11 states operates,
and embed this into the drivers.
The Results As we have seen in the results from section 4.2, SIDS was
perfectly able to detect if another STA were using the legit STA’s creden-
tials (hence, IP-address and MAC address), and was authenticating and
associating with the same AP. It is important for the IDS to keep track
of all 7 Management Frames that can affect the STAs state. These are
provided in the list from section 3.5.1. By now SIDS are not optimized
to deal with re-association and re-authentication frames, but this should
be an easy implementation if the IDS is to be deployed. Another aspect
which should be looked at is what happens if the IDS is not able to detect
a management frame of importance to the 802.11 state for the STA. If the
frame is not picked up by the IDS, the state control diagram in SIDS will
become different from that of the AP and STA. This will probably result in
the IDS triggering false alarms, or get confused and will not trigger alarms.
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Nevertheless, during my experiments I did not lose a single management
frame, and one should make sure before deploying the system that the IDS
is as close to the monitored AP as possible, as well as verify that it will not
lose these frames in a highly trafficked environment.
5.1.2 Active Probing using ICMP
In section 3.5.2 I showed how I implemented an active detection technique,
issuing a PING request, and see if we get two answers originating from the
same source MAC address. This is implemented in SIDS v2.0 at step 2e
as described in section 3.3.6, instead of performing an Euclidian distance
algorithm as proposed by [3]. Instead of relying on physical parameters, I
have implemented a technique which is based on how 802.11 networks oper-
ate. The implementation is just a proof-of-concept, and due to the firewall
problems discussed below, one should look into how to use other probing
techniques as well. Nevertheless, the results from section 4.3 shows that it in
fact two replies were recorded on the IDS, meaning that the detection tech-
nique works under the right circumstances. I have also implemented this in
SIDS, by issuing a ping packet to the desired IP address if a QoS optimized
attack should be verified. As we will see in the next chapter, this technique
alone is not necessary good enough. If the attacker has gained knowledge of
how the IDS works, and drops every probe request from the IDS, the system
will not trigger alarms. As a result of this, my final proposed and optimized
algorithm in chapter 7 suggest that this technique should be embedded, but
techniques from chapter 6 should also be considered and implemented.
TCP Example This is another example of an active probing technique.
If TCP packets are not dropped by the attacker, the IDS could for instance
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use nmap2 to issue a specific TCP packet named TCP+SYN (TCP synchro-
nize), and see if two identical SYN+ACK (TCP acknowledgement) packets
are picked up. The idea behind this detection use exactly the same basics
as the one implemented in SIDS, but instead use specifics from the TCP
protocol, not ICMP, in order to detect attacks. As you might see, there are
many forms for active probing, and one could potentially look at each of the
layers in the OSI model from figure 2.1, in order to find suitable protocols
and applications that issues active probing. The obvious down sight to this
approach, as stated above, is that potentially every probing request could
be dropped by an attacker if he has knowledge on how the IDS operates.
To cope with this, new techniques will be proposed in chapter 7.
5.2 SIDS - Where Are We At?
As SIDS v2.0 developed throughout the writing of this thesis, it has become
quite advanced. SIDS v1.0, as developed during the project assignment, was
a fairly simple IDS. The obvious gain from the project report was the dis-
covery of the problems with 802.11e enabled wireless networks as handled
in this thesis. The re-writing of SIDS from section 3.3, made the IDS more
programmable understandable, as well as optimized to cope with QoS en-
abled wireless networks. With the new detection techniques from above
implemented, the IDS are able to keep false positives to a minimum, as
well as trigger alarms when the newly QoS optimized attack is performed.
Nevertheless, as described in the previous section, the implemented detec-
tion techniques should be easy for an advanced attacker to counter. As a
result of this, I need to look into other techniques. In the next chapter
2nmap is a security scanner, used to discover hosts and services on a computer network,
thus creating a "map" of the network
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I will analyze and elaborate on further enhancements outside techniques
implemented in SIDS.
5.2.1 SIDS as an IDS
SIDS is not far from ready to be deployed as a complete IDS system. As
described in section 3.4, there are a few parameters that should be tested
and analyzed in regards to sequence counting. The most important is how
far sequence number offsets can be, and how SIDS should deal with lost
frames - especially management frames in regards to passive detection. I
will also state that other detection techniques should be implemented in
SIDS, not only relying on one single measuring technique. Even though
RSS values can be unreliable in urban and mobile environments, one could
implement this, together with RTS/CTS RTT as described in section 2.4.4,
as an extra detection technique. In the latter case it is important to un-
derstand the level of false positives this potentially could provide, and one
should carefully analyze how the detection techniques should relate to each
other. From [2], we described that triggering of an alarm should base its
roots on strong statistical analysis of events triggered from several different
detection techniques.
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Analytic Detection Techniques
In chapter 5 I have implemented and tested two types of detection tech-
niques in SIDSv2.0. During the development of the IDS, I also came across
interesting thoughts and ideas to new methods in order to detect attacks
in 80.211e enabled open wireless networks. In this chapter I will present
my theories, and even though these are not implemented in my IDS at this
stage, their implementation and testing should be a less challenging task
for future work as described in section 8.
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6.1 The 802.11e and WMM relationship
As detailed in my theory chapter 2, section 2.5.1 and 2.5, WMM use only 4
of the 8 available TID bits in 802.11e. Parameters in the beacon frames of
AP tells the STAs which QoS scheme that are supported. In my lab setup,
WMM is used. This means that the STA can use the 4 classes, namely
Best-effort, Background, Video and Voice. Table 6.1 shows how the WMM
classes are reflected as 802.11e TID bits.
TID bits WMM Class
000 Best-Effort
001 Background
010 Video
011 Voice
100 Not used
101 Not used
110 Not used
111 Not used
Table 6.1: Relationship between TID bits and WMM Classes
If an attacker inject his frames to that of a different QoS class that isn’t
in use in the specific QoS scheme, one could trigger alarms if TID bits are
used by a STA which isn’t supported by the network. It is unreasonable to
believe that a legitimate STA will use TID class 1xx in a WMM environ-
ment, as the parameter exchange during the association phase from figure
2.4 tells the STA that only WMM is in used, and there is no point in using
other TID classes than the ones defined above.
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As a result of this, one should be able to detect this type of attack,
simply by verifying that the most significant TID bits in each QoS Data
and management frame from a STA is not -1-.
In general, one could look at which QoS parameters are ex-
changed during the association phase when a STA associates
with an AP, and see if the behavior of TID bits in the subse-
quent frames are according to what is expected when using the
specific QoS management scheme.
6.2 Application and TID analysis
The techniques proposed in section 6.1 above are indeed interesting. Never-
theless, as described in section 3.2, a QoS optimized attack does not have to
use the -4- last TID classes in order to be successful. A simple scenario will
be when a STA is in fact not using WMM Video or Voice Access Categories,
or simply is not using WMM at all. In this case, the attacker can flag every
frame with TID bits 010 or 011, masquerading as the STA using Voice or
Video, again fooling the detection system. In this section I will propose
another enhancement to cope with this type attack, by moving away from
the MAC layer of the OSI model, and on to higher layers.
6.2.1 Application and Protocol Based Detection
As the network considered in this thesis are of type open 802.11 wireless
network, there are no encryption of frames, and the IDS can read informa-
tion on the application level in the OSI model from figure 2.1. As a result of
this, I will here propose another technique which will see if the application
or protocol fragmented into a specific frame is logically according to which
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TID bits which are set. As described above an attacker could fool TID
analysis by using TID bits that are not in use by the STA, but is a part
of the QoS scheme. If this is the case, one could look at the TID bits and
see if they are reasonable in regards to the application or protocol used.
An example is provided in the next chapter, and in more general terms we
could describe this technique as
Look at the relationship between the TID bits and which appli-
cation or protocol used on the frame. If this relationship is not
reasonable, it should be an indication that a QoS optimized at-
tack has taken place.
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New Proposed Algorithm
In section 3.3 I looked at the proposed algorithm for QoS considered detec-
tion, and throughout this thesis I have elaborated on alternative detection
techniques instead of relying on uncertain physical parameters. I have con-
centrated primarily on looking at the second layer in the OSI model. In this
chapter I will propose a new algorithm based on the results and discussion
from chapters II to 6.
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7.1 The Algorithm
Even though not every part of the algorithm below is implemented in SIDS
v2.0, the discussions froom chapter 6 should be fairly easy to implement
in Intrusion Detection Systems, such as SIDS v2.0. By analyzing which
Quality-of-Service scheme is used, as well as look at the other layers of the
OSI model, the algorithm should be a good guide in how to cope with the
QoS problems described throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to understand that this algorithm requires the network to be an open
802.11 wireless network. This is due to the fact that it relies on reading
frame information from higher levels in the OSI model, which is usually
encrypted when using features from 802.11i1. The algorithm is provided
below, and in section 7.2 I will give my explanations in regards to how the
algorithm operates.
Algorithm : Find−Ident i ty−Spoofs 2
Input : S : Sequence o f w i r e l e s s packets
Output : Attack/No_Attack
MACs = l i s t o f MAC sequence numbers in S ;
i f MACs in l i n e a r p rog r e s s i on then
return No_Attack ;
else i f MAC va r i a t i o n in va l i d range then
return No_Attack ;
/∗ MAC sequences not in l i n e a r
progre s s ion ; check frame types ∗/
FTypes = frame types ex t rac t ed from S ;
i f FTypes 2 {Management , Regular Data} then
return Attack ;
/∗ Frame type must be QoS−Data ; examine
1802.11i is a part of the 802.11-2007 standard, and provides security features for 802.11
wireless networks
82
7.2. NEW FEATURES
p r i o r i t i e s ∗/
QoS−P r i o r i t i e s = QoS p r i o r i t i e s ex t rac t ed from S ;
i f QoS−P r i o r i t i e s are a l l the same then
return Attack ;
/∗ QoS p r i o r i t i e s are e i t h e r mixed , or
mixed QoS−data and regu l a r data ∗/
Active probe the c l i e n t s l i s t e d in MACs;
i f Two i d e n t i c a l r e sponse s r e c e i v ed then
return Attack ;
/∗ The a t t a c k e r cou ld be us ing f i r e w a l l or
countermeassures f o r a c t i v e probing ∗/
Ver i fy QoS Scheme , ana lyse TID b i t s ext raced from S ;
i f TID b i t s ou t s id e QoS scheme then
return Attack ;
/∗ TID b i t s are i n s i d e the s p e c i f i c QoS scheme used ∗/
Analyse app l i c a t i o n or p ro to co l used in packets from S ;
i f Appl i ca t ion type d i f f e r s from expected TID class then
return Attack ,
return No_Attack ;
Listing 7.1: Optimized algorithm for QoS considered identity spoof
detection
7.2 New Features
When writing about new features in an algorithm, it is also important to
describe which ones that are removed. As described in this paper, my initial
goal was to move away from the physical layer in order to create a more
reliable and analytic detection algorithm. As RSS values can be unreliable
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in urban mobile environments, the algorithm does not take RSS values into
consideration, but relies on analysis of the 802.11 standard, as well as how
802.11e is implemented. As a result of this the following has been removed:
Perform d i f f e r e n t i a l l o c a l i z a t i o n for packets in S ;
i f Eucl idean d i s t ance between s u c c e s s i v e packets exceeds
th r e sho ld then
return Attack ;
Instead, the algorithm suggest using active probing techniques as de-
scribed in section 3.5.2 and 5.1.2. Due to the risk of an attacker potentially
fooling the Active Probing technique (refr: i.e. Firewalls issues from section
5.1.2), the algorithm continues verification by analyzing the QoS scheme
negotiated between the legitimate STA and the wireless environment. It
will see if the TID classes are within the same range as the QoS scheme
used. If this is the case, it will further look at other layers, and see if the
TID classes that are set, are logically in regards to which application or
protocol used. For instance, if frames are marked with TID class 010 (video
from WMM) and WMM is used, and the packet shows that it is the TCP
protocol which is used, it is unreasonable that this is in fact a legit STA -
as video streaming uses UDP. I will not in this thesis propose an overview
over which applications or protocols are expected to use which TID classes,
and is subject for future work as described in chapter 8.
802.11 State Control In section3.5.1 I described my theory and im-
plementation of a passive detection technique which I called 802.11 State
Control. This is not part of the algorithm above, but should definitely be
considered in regards to deploying a complete IDS system. This method will
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work fine on its own, and is not directly dependent on other techniques like
the ones described in the algorithm. Nevertheless, as IDS should provide
the administrator of a network with a statistical analysis of what triggered
the alarm, one should relate the different techniques to each other, and
verify the level of credibility to the triggered alarm by combining different
techniques. However, this is not considered here, and is as noted earlier,
subject for future work as described in section .
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Future Work
Even though the work done in this thesis is quite comprehensive, there are
several subjects which should be suitable for future work. There are proba-
bly many things that could potentially be taken into consideration, but the
most important ones are provided in section 8.1 and 8.2. Unfortunately I
did not have time to test and verify all of my new techniques, and I find
the analytic detection techniques from chapter 6 really interesting. It is
reasonable to believe that the work needed to implement and test these
techniques in SIDS should be less challenging, and I think that definitely
this is a subject for future work and should be further looked into.
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8.1 Active Probing - Beyond Proof of Concept
As I have discussed throughout section 5.1.2, the Active Probing technique
implemented in SIDS v2.0 is not good enough. The technique is too easy for
an attacker to avoid. Nevertheless, the idea behind active probing should
be analyzed further, and I believe that there exist other probing techniques
that should be suitable for this use. As stated earlier, one could look at each
of the layers in the OSI model, looking at protocols and applications that
can be used as probing. This is actually an advantage when working with
open 802.11 wireless networks, where one has access to everything from all
layers.
8.2 Completing The IDS
The new proposed algorithm from chapter 7 is indeed interesting. Neverthe-
less, there are several issues that should be elaborated on. First of all, the
algorithm should be implemented and tested in an IDS, where I of course
highly recommend using SIDS v2.0. One of the challenges here is to analyze
which applications and protocols use a QoS Scheme, and provide SIDS with
the proper information so it can distinguish between these and determine
attacks if the application or protocol used is not in logical relationship with
the TID bits set. As a result of this implementation, SIDS should be close
to testing and deployment, but the centralizations issues discussed in our
project assignment from 2009 [2] should also be taken into consideration.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have seen that with the introduction of link-layer Quality-of-
Service in wireless networks, there are problems with using MAC Sequence
Counting Analysis as a detection technique in wireless Intrusion Detection
Systems. As many IDS heavily rely on this detection technique, this thesis
proposes new techniques in order to cope with the new features. As we have
seen, this is a complicated matter, and others [3] have proposed techniques
which uses physical parameters to verify if QoS optimized attacks has taken
place as described in section 3.2. However, the thesis questions the use of
physical parameters in an urban and mobile environment, and throughout
this report I propose new and more reliable techniques which use protocol
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specific analysis to detect abnormalities and attacks. The outcome of this
thesis was divided into two parts. The first part was developing an IDS,
named SIDS v2.0 which implements new detection techniques to cope with
the 802.11e/QoS problems described in the introduction. The second con-
tribution is a new proposed algorithm which is a more general approach to
the same problem. This algorithm is provided in chapter 7 and is based
on analytic and theoretical analysis of the 802.11 standard and the 802.11e
amendent, as well as some of the techniques implemented in SIDS v2.0.
9.1 Simple Intrusion Detection System v2.0
SIDS v2.0 has really grown during the writing of this thesis. It has been
optimized to deal with how to handle several MAC Sequence counter si-
multaneously, as well as keep track of many several STAs and detection
checks at the same time. The IDS also implements a detection technique
in order to verify if a QoS optimized attack is taken place as shown in sec-
tion 3.2 and5.1.2. I find that by developing SIDS according to the scheme
provided in sections 3.3 and 3.4, the IDS has become more programmable
understandable, and should be a proper framework in further development
of the IDS. Nevertheless, as stated in chapter 8, it also opens up for several
subjects that are classified as future work before we can consider SIDS to
be a complete Intrusion Detection System. Perhaps a name change of the
IDS should be considered.
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9.2 Enhanced Algorithm For QoS Optimized At-
tacks
In chapter 6 I elaborated on new detection techniques which should be
a counter meassure to the problems from section 3.2. These techniques
are based on analytic discussion of the 802.11e amendent, and should be
suitable for implementation in wireless Intrusion Detection Systems such as
SIDS v2.0. It is reasonable to believe that from an attackers perspective,
it would be difficult to avoid the system, as it use protocol and behavior
analysis in order to detect attacks. As a summary of this discussion, an
enhanced algorithm for detection of QoS optimized attacks are provided
in chapter 7. The techniques proposed here does not rely in uncertain
physical parameters like RSS measurements, but instead concentrates on
how 802.11e operates and is expected to behave. As described in chapter 8
section 8.2 I am proposing that the algorithm should be implemented and
tested in SIDS v2.0, and I believe that the ideas presented here should be
a great enhancement to Intrusion Detection Systems in general.
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A
Valid Types and Subtypes
95
Type value Type Description Subtype Value Subtype description
00 Management 0000 Association Request
00 Management 0001 Association Response
00 Management 0010 Reassociation request
00 Management 0011 Reassociation response
00 Management 0100 Probe request
00 Management 0101 Probe response
00 Management 0110-0111 Reserved
00 Management 1000 Beacon
00 Management 1001 ATIM
00 Management 1010 Disassociation
00 Management 1011 Authentication
00 Management 1100 Deauthentication
00 Management 1101 Action
00 Management 1110-1111 Reserved
01 Control 0000-0111 Reserved
01 Control 1000 Block Ack Request
01 Control 1001 Block Ack
01 Control 1010 PS-Poll
01 Control 1011 RTS
01 Control 1100 CTS
01 Control 1101 ACK
01 Control 1111 CF-END
10 Data 0000 Data
10 Data 0001 Data + CF-Ack
10 Data 0010 Data + CF-Ack + CF-Poll
10 Data 0100 Null (no data)
10 Data 0101 CF-Ack (no data)
10 Data 0110 CF-Poll (no data)
10 Data 0111 CF-Ack + CF-Poll (no data)
10 Data 1000 QoS Data
10 Data 1001 QoS Data + CF-Ack
10 Data 1010 QoS Data + CF-Poll
10 Data 1011 QoS Data + CF-Poll + CF-Ack
10 Data 1100 QoS Null (no data)
10 Data 1101 Reserved
10 Data 1110 QoS CF-Poll (no data)
10 Data 1111 QoS CF-Ack + CF-Poll (no data)
11 Reserved 0000-1111 Reserved
Table A.1: Valid type and subtype combinations in 802.11 frames
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B
SIDS V2.0 code
B.1 sidsv2.pl
#!/ usr / bin / p e r l
2 #
# SIMPLE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM v2 .0
4 #
# by
6 #
# Eir i k Holgernes
8 #
10 use Net : : Pcap ;
use NetPacket : : Ethernet ;
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12 use NetPacket : : IP ;
use NetPacket : :TCP;
14 use Bit : : Vector ;
16 use IO : : Handle ;
18 my (
$pcap_err ,
20 $pcap_descr ,
$heade ro f f s e t ,
22 $READTIMEOUT,
$SNAPLEN,
24 $PROMISC,
$TIMEOUT,
26 $INTERFACE,
$srcmac ,
28 $ f i l e c oun t ,
@bss id_l i s t ,
30 $ f i l e
) ;
32
my $ l o g f i l e = "/var / log / s i d s " ;
34
my %SrcSeq = ( ) ; # Source MAC/Sequence Number combination
36
my %SrcAlm = ( ) ; # Source MAC/Alarm Counter combination
38
my $dumpfi le = "/home/rybak/Master/no_qos . cap" ; # Execute t h i s s c r i p t
on an o f f l i n e cap f i l e
40
my %qos_mac = ( ) ; #QoS/MAC combination
42
my %cnt_mac = ( ) ; #Counter and MAC combo
44
my %mac_state = ( ) ; # Mac adress and 802.11 s t a t e
46
# Due to t e s t i n g purposes we w i l l s e t one MAC address as a l l r e a d y in
s t a t e 3 (11) −−> PAPER!
48 my $test_mac = "002608 e8 f8a3 " ;
98
$mac_state{ $test_mac } = "11" ;
50
52 $READTIMEOUT = 1000 ; # Read timeout on packages
54 @bss id_l i s t = ( "00235 d0dfbf0 " , " fu tu r e " ) ; # Sta t i c added fo r now (LAP
at o f f i c e )
56 $PROMISC = 1 ; # Lis ten to a l l packets , Promiscous mode
58 $SNAPLEN=200; # How much of each frame to be p icked up
60 $INTERFACE = "wlan0" ; # Defines i n t e r f a c e f o r l i s t e n i n g
62 $ f i l e c o un t = 0 ;
64 # Open capture in t e r f a c e , and loop on each captured packet
print "Capturing t r a f f i c . . . \ n" ;
66
68
70 # l i v e packet capture
# my $capture = Net : : Pcap : : open_live ($INTERFACE, $SNAPLEN, $PROMISC,
$READTIMEOUT,\ $pcap_err ) ;
72
# o f f l i n e packet capture
74
76 my $capture = Net : : Pcap : : open_of f l i ne ( $dumpfi le , \ $e r r ) ;
78 my $w802 = Net : : Pcap : : datalink_name_to_val ( ’DLT_IEEE802_11 ’ ) ;
80 Net : : Pcap : : s e t_data l ink ( $capture , $w802 ) ;
82 Net : : Pcap : : loop ( $capture , −1, \&process_pkt , ’ ’ ) ;
84
99
86 unless ( defined $capture ) {
die ’ Unable to c r e a t e packet capture on dev i ce ’ , "wlan0" , ’ − ’ ,
$pcap_err ;
88 }
die ’ Unable to perform packet capture ’
90 unless Net : : Pcap : : loop ( $capture , −1, \&process_pkt , ’ ’ ) ;
92 # c l o s e pcap
i f ( $capture ) {
94 Net : : Pcap : : close ( $capture ) ;
}
96
sub process_pkt {
98 my ( $data , $hdr , $packet ) = @_;
100 my $ f ramect l = unpack( ’B∗ ’ , substr ( $packet , 24 , 1) ) ; # The 802.11
header s t a r t s from the 24 th by te
my $dst_id = unpack( ’H∗ ’ , substr ( $packet , 28 , 6) ) ;
102 my $src_id = unpack( ’H∗ ’ , substr ( $packet , 34 , 6) ) ;
my $bss_id = unpack( ’H∗ ’ , substr ( $packet , 40 , 6) ) ; # Not used
by now
104 my $seq_ct l = unpack( ’H∗ ’ , substr ( $packet , 46 , 2) ) ; # Keeps the
sequence number
my $qos = unpack( ’B∗ ’ , substr ( $packet , 53 , 2) ) ; # These are
the QoS b i t s
106 my $timestamp_m = ${$hdr }{ ’ tv_usec ’ } ; # Timestamp
in mi l l i s e c ond s f o r t h i s packe t
my $timestamp_s = ${$hdr }{ ’ tv_sec ’ } ; # Timestamp
in seconds f o r t h i s packet
108
# Only the 12 l a s t b i t s on the Seq CTL f i e l d used f o r seq number .
Counting to 4096 (2^12 = 4096) and loops
110 my $seqnr2 = substr ( $seq_ctl , 2 , 2) . substr ( $seq_ctl , 0 , 1) ;
112 my $seqnr = hex( $seqnr2 ) ;
114 # Type o f frame
my $frametype = substr ( $ f ramect l , 4 , 2) ;
116 my $subtype = substr ( $ f ramect l , 0 , 4) ;
100
my ( $subtype_raw , $type_raw ) = sp l i t ( // , unpack( ’H∗ ’ , substr (
$packet , 32 , 1 ) ) ) ;
118
# Extrac t the TID b i t s from QoS f i e l d
120 my $ t id = substr ( $qos , 0 , 3) ;
122 # Check i f an ICMP echo check i s r equ i red :
i f (−e $ ipad r e s s ) {
124 print " I w i l l now check f o r dup l i c a t e ICMP rep ly ’ s " ;
126 }
128 # Check i f the frame i s o f our conserne , e l s e drop
foreach ( @bss id_l i s t ) {
130 i f ($_ eq $dst_id ) {
# packet i s i n t e r e s s t i n g , and intended to be use with our
LAP
132
# F i l t e r on management frames , v e r i f y 802.11 s t a t e s
134 i f ( $frametype == "00" ) {
# Assoc ia t ion Request
136 i f ( $subtype == "0000" ) {
i f ( ! ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == ("11" or "10" ) ) ) {
138 print "Attack ! $src_id a l r eady a s s o c i a t ed \n" ;
} e l s i f ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == "01" ) {
140 $mac_state{ $src_mac } = "11" ;
} e l s i f ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == "00" ) {
142 # Should NOT happen !
$mac_state{ $src_mac } = "10" ;
144 }
}
146
# Assoc ia t ion Response
148 i f ( $subtype == "0001" ) {
print "Assoc i a t i on Response \n" ;
150 }
152 # Reassoc ia t ion Request
i f ( $subtype == "0010" ) {
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154 print "Reas soc i a t i on Request \n" ;
}
156
# Reassoc ia t ion Response
158 i f ( $subtype == "0011" ) {
print "Reas soc i a t i on Response \n" ;
160 }
162 # Disas soc ia t i on
i f ( $subtype == "1010" ) {
164 i f ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == "10" ) {
$mac_state{ $src_mac } = "00" ;
166 } e l s i f ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == "11" ) {
$mac_state{ $src_mac } = "01" ;
168 }
print " D i s a s s o c i a t i o n \n" ;
170 }
172 # Authent ica t ion
i f ( $subtype == "1011" ) {
174 i f ( ! ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == ("11" or "01" ) ) ) {
print "Attack ! $src_id a l r eady authent i ca ted \n" ;
176 } e l s i f ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == "00" ) {
$mac_state{ $src_mac } = "01" ;
178 } e l s i f ( $mac_state{ $src_mac } == "10" ) {
$mac_state{ $src_mac } = "11" ;
180 }
}
182
# Deauthent ica t ion
184 i f ( $subtype == "1100" ) {
$mac_state{ $src_mac } = "00" ;
186 print "Deauthent icat ion \n" ;
}
188
190 }
192 # Proceed with Sequence Number Analys i s
102
i f ( $src_id =~ m/^./) {
194 keepsequence ( $src_id , $seqnr , $frametype , $subtype ,
$t id , $timestamp_m , $timestamp_s ) ;
}
196
}
198 }
200 }
202 # Step 1a
sub keepsequence {
204 my ($MAC, $SEQ, $FRT, $SUBTYPE, $TID , $TIMESTMP_M, $TIMESTMP_S) =
@_;
206 # Drop proces s ing packe t s i f a sequence check i s ongoing ( sample
t e s t i n g ) DISCUSS IN PAPER!
# Koble timestamps f ra o f f l i n e mode t i l en rea l−time s e t t i n g . ( se
pŇ l o k a l t i d e n her mot timestamps )
208
210 # 1a) Keep one sequence fo r each MAC adress (on d i s k ) , and
keep the parameters .
212
# my $ l i n e s = ‘wc − l < $MAC‘ i f (−e $MAC) ;
214
216 # Keep a sequence o f 10 frames f o r t h i s s p e c i f i c MAC adress
i f ( $cnt_mac{ $MAC } < 55000) {
218 open(MACFILE, ’>> ’ , $MAC) ;
print MACFILE "$MAC:$SEQ:$FRT:$SUBTYPE: $TID :$TIMESTMP_M:
$TIMESTMP_S\n" ;
220 close (MACFILE) ;
} else {
222
# rename($MAC, $MAC. " . check ") or d ie "Could not rename
f i l e : $MAC";
224
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# $ f i l e = $MAC. " . check " ;
226
# Cal l a background process check
228 print "Ka l l e r pŇ bakgrunnsprosess med parametre : $MAC
count i s $cnt_mac{ $MAC } \n\n" ;
exec ( "/ usr / bin / p e r l " , "/home/rybak/Master/ check . p l " , $MAC
) or die " exec f a i l e d : $?" ;
230 }
232 my $count = $cnt_mac { $MAC } ;
$count = $count + 1 ;
234
$cnt_mac{ $MAC } = $count ;
236
}
B.2 check.pl
#!/ usr / bin / p e r l
2 #
# SIMPLE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM v2 .0
4 #
#
6 # by
#
8 # Eir i k Holgernes
#
10 # −−−−−−− CHECK SEQUENCE SCRIPT −−−−−−−−
#
12 #
14 my $ l o g f i l e = "/var / log / s i d s " ;
16 my $MAC = $ARGV[ 0 ] ;
print "background proce s s c a l l e d with argument : $MAC" ;
18
check_l inprog ($MAC) ;
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20
# Step 2a and 2b
22 sub check_l inprog {
print " S ta r t i ng up check_l inprog \n\n" ;
24 my $ f i l e = $_ [ 0 ] ;
26 #Change in the f u tu r e . . . f o r now
my $counter = 0 ;
28 my $OLD = 0 ;
30 # Extrac t each sequence number , compare and t e s t f o r l i n e a r
progre s s ion
open (MACFILE, $ f i l e ) ;
32 while (<MACFILE>) {
chomp ;
34 my ($MAC, $SEQ, $FRT, $FRTSUB, $TID , $TIME_M, $TIME_S) =
sp l i t ( / : / , $_) ;
36 # Check i f l i n e a r progres s ion or wi th in t r e s h o l d
i f ( ($SEQ − $OLD > 10) && ($OLD != 4095) && ($SEQ != 4095) ) {
38 $counter = $counter+1;
}
40 $OLD = $SEQ;
}
42 # Allow 5 error s f o r now : )
i f ( $counter > 5) {
44 # Frames are not in l innear progress ion , go to s t ep 2c )
check_frtypes ( $ f i l e ) ;
46 } else {
# Frames are in l innear progress ion , conclude no a t t a c k and
drop sequence
48 unlink ( $ f i l e ) ;
print "\nFrames were in l i n e a r progre s s i on , do not con t i n i u e
check \n" ;
50
}
52
close (MACFILE) ;
54
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}
56
58 # Step 2c
sub check_frtypes {
60 print " S ta r t i ng up check_frtypes \n\n" ;
# At t h i s po in t the frames are in the sequence are NOT in l innear
progress ion , l e t s check to see i f the frames are non−QoS
62 my $ f i l e = $_ [ 0 ] ;
64 my $counter = 0 ;
my $OLD_TID;
66
open (MACFILE, $ f i l e ) ;
68 while (<MACFILE>) {
chomp ;
70 my ($MAC, $SEQ, $FRT, $FRTSUB, $TID , $TIME_M, $TIME_S) =
sp l i t ( / : / , $_) ;
# TID c l a s s s e t to "000" i f QoS are not used?
72 i f ($TID != "000" ) {
$counter = $counter + 1 ;
74 }
76 }
78 i f ( $counter > 0) {
# Assuming the frametypes are QoS, l e t s check i f a l l p r i o r i t y
c l a s s e s are equa l
80 equa l_pr i o r i ty ( $ f i l e ) ;
82 } else {
# Frames are e i t h e r o f type MGMT or Regular Data . Conclude
at tack , and drop sequence .
84 my $logmsg = "Step 2c − Attack on Source MAC: $MAC" ;
write_log ( $logmsg ) ;
86 unlink (MACFILE) ;
}
88
close (MACFILE) ;
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90
}
92
94 # Step 2d − Assuming tha t the frames are QoS type , l e t s check i f the
p r i o r i t y c l a s s e s are equa l everywhere
sub equa l_pr i o r i ty {
96 print " S ta r t i ng up equa l_pr i o r i t y \n\n" ;
my $ f i l e = $_ [ 0 ] ;
98
my $OLD_TID = 0 ;
100
my $equal = 0 ;
102
open (MACFILE, $ f i l e ) ;
104 while (<MACFILE>) {
chomp ;
106 my ($MAC, $SEQ, $FRT, $FRTSUB, $TID , $TIME_M, $TIME_S) =
sp l i t ( / : / , $_) ;
i f ( ! ( $TID == $OLD_TID) ) {
108 my @parts = gmtime($TIME_S) ;
print "The equal counter i n c r ea s ed at SEQ: $SEQ at time "
;
110 printf ( "%4d:%4d:%4d\n" , @parts [ 2 , 1 , 0 ] ) ;
print "\n" ;
112 $equal = $equal+ 1 ;
}
114 }
116 i f ( $equal > 1) {
# Pr i o r i t i e s are e i t h e r mixed or mixed QoS−data and regu l a r
data , i n i t i a t e sequence 2e
118 print "\n Equal counter i s now on : $equal \n" ;
ve r i fy_at tack ( $ f i l e ) ;
120 } else {
# Pr io r i t y c l a s s e s are equa l a l l the way , conclude at tack ,
and drop sequence
122 my $logmsg = "Step 2d − Attack on Source MAC: $MAC" ;
write_log ( $logmsg ) ;
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124 unlink (MACFILE) ;
}
126
close (MACFILE) ;
128
}
130
# Step 2e
132 sub ver i f y_at tack {
134 # Active probing from ICMP echoes in ping
136 # By now I j u s t s e t a s t a t i c IP to a c l i e n t ( t h i s cou ld be read
from any TCP packet )
my $ ipad r e s s = " 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 2 " ;
138
# Create a f i l e on d i s k with the IP . This w i l l t e l l the main
program , t ha t an ICMP check i s requ i red
140 system ( " touch" , $ i pad r e s s ) ;
142
# In i t i a t e the ICMP echo reques t , w i l l wai t u n t i l l f i n i s h e d
144 system ( " ping " , "−c 1" , $ i pad r e s s ) ;
146 #
}
148
# Simple LOG wr i t i n g func t i on
150 sub write_log {
my ( $logmsg ) = @_;
152
my ( $sec , $min , $hour , $mday , $mon , $year ) = localtime (time ) ;
154
open LOGFILE, ">>$ l o g f i l e " or die " cannot open l o g f i l e $ l o g f i l e
f o r appending : $ ! " ;
156
print "\n ##### LOGGED! ! ##### \n" ;
158
108
printf LOGFILE "%4d−%02d−%02d %02d:%02d:%02d −−> " , $year+1900 ,
$mon+1,$mday , $hour , $min , $sec ;
160 print LOGFILE $logmsg , "\n" ;
close LOGFILE;
162
}
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